I read an interesting report on the progress of the Iraqi Army in the WaPost today. The reporters went out with a 'unit' of Iraqis from Baiji. As I would have expected from one of the 'homegrown' units raised from within Sunni territory, the unit is a mess. Unfortunately, unless those same Post reporters spend more time viewing the progress of the Iraqi army as a whole, they will only be reporting a small piece of the story.
Depending on where one visits...and where/how the individual Iraqi units were trained, the story can be quite different. Those units trained, equipped, and organized in Baghdad over the last few months are quite professional, with a core of good leaders who understand their mandate and what is at stake. For those units hastily formed prior to about 6 months ago, life is hard. The units are poorly trained and disciplined. They are under-equipped. If stationed near their homes, their lives and the lives of their families are constantly at risk.
For those 'recruited' from locales in which the insurgency runs strong, the job means little more than a paycheck...and views of the U.S. are skewed by their perception of Saddam's era as positive. The story from those units recruited from Shia and Kurd regions...or from the newer units that have been properly trained, equipped, and integrated is entirely different. And until more of those 'real' units complete training and begin taking their place in the order of battle, U.S. soldiers are left doing what they can with the hostile audience described in the Post story.
So what does all that mean? #1, it means the Post story only covers a fraction of the issues over here. #2, it means there is still a long way to go in establishing Iraqi sovereignty in traditional insurgent strongholds. #3, it means we are likely to see a continuing string of negative stories by reporters exposed to the weak units - or seeking the weak units out as they seek to provide a 'truth' they suspect is lacking from official military information sources. #4, it means the 'truth,' once again, lies somewhere in the middle. Iraqi security forces have become more proficient. It has been a slow process. There are currently setbacks to counter many of the gains made. But, at least in Baghdad, the tide is beginning to turn. And as Baghdad turns, we can expect morale to increase among Iraqi forces.
All that being said, in many neighborhoods where memories of Saddam are not quite so 'glorious' (to put it lightly), the ultimate 'unprejudiced authority' remains U.S. or other MNF troops. Until more Iraqis start to believe in their own security forces (and are given reason to do so), the fight remains difficult. We will never build an army in Iraq to rival our own - or likely even to rival the army being built in Afghanistan. The factionalism remains too strong, the distrust of central authority (be it the U.S. or the transitional government) remains too deep, and the cultural divide too broad. That DOESN'T mean we can't plant the seeds for a stable, democratic Iraq...it just means the 'tree' that sprouts from those seeds will take some extra nourishing, even as it grows in directions we never expected.