Monday, January 17, 2005

As if on cue...(Updated)

UPDATE: Let me say this up-front: I suspect I will be tinkering with this entry as I think through a lot of what I've read from Mr. Hersh. He covers a lot of topics here and does so in a manner that is at times insightful, at other times naive, and occasionally just plain foolish.

Seymour Hersh has published a lengthy article in the New Yorker today that expands considerably on the dribs and drabs covered last week in Newsweek regarding the so-called "Salvadoran option."

The article is far-reaching and comprehensive, covering everything from DoD attempts to wrest control from the CIA of so-called "covert operations" to alleged current military activities in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. That being said, I disagree with his opening statement:

The President and his national-security advisers have consolidated control over the military and intelligence communities’ strategic analyses and covert operations to a degree unmatched since the rise of the post-Second World War national-security state.

Perhaps a better phrasing would be that the Pentagon has attempted to consolidate greater control over "covert operations to a degree unmatched since the rise of the...national-security state." Whether that has yet been accomplished is still impossible to judge - at least from the information provided in the article.

The CIA at its birth was given an incredible degree of latitude, largely because few within the upper levels of government at the time expected the next 'hot' conflict to be long in coming - and they wanted to be ready when it arrived.

Although based on the (mostly) military OSS, the CIA has, over the years, lost its paramilitary capabilities as it has chosen largely to recruit from elite universities. This change has had unforeseen consequences throughout the period of time in which it has had control of so-called covert operations.

I give Mr. Hersh credit for this: he has talked to folks from all sides of the spectrum. We hear from officers anxious to ensure there is better intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program, from agency officials frustrated with DoD efforts to push them aside, from naysayers worried that DoD can only do worse than the Agency in their efforts to gather information and act upon it.

I take him to task, however, for dancing lightly around the core issue that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program and is very unlikely to end that program because of incentives offered from the Europeans, the Americans, or anyone else. If nothing else, we have learned that lesson from the slow expansion of nuclear powers since the '60s and '70s. He also fails to understand that human intelligence has proven to be a necessary tool in determining how policy is to be implemented. By providing information regarding human intelligence operations and collection methods, he is endangering the lives of those who carry out those operations and the validity of the information they have gathered.

If we understand that Iran is intent on developing nuclear weapons (occasionally implied in his article):

The core problem is that Iran has successfully hidden the extent of its nuclear program, and its progress. Many Western intelligence agencies, including those of the United States, believe that Iran is at least three to five years away from a capability to independently produce nuclear warheads—although its work on a missile-delivery system is far more advanced.

...and that they gained considerable insight from A. Q. Khan's nuclear black market operation (very implicitly stated in the article):

A. Q. Khan, known as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, to the I.A.E.A. or to any other international authorities for questioning. For two decades, Khan has been linked to a vast consortium of nuclear-black-market activities. Last year, Musharraf professed to be shocked when Khan, in the face of overwhelming evidence, “confessed” to his activities.

...then it is the responsibility of the administration to develop a broad strategy for dealing with these efforts. That would naturally include preparing a military option - as well as gathering the best intelligence available from whatever sources seem most reliable. Hersh fairly presents this as a necessary step:
The Pentagon’s contingency plans for a broader invasion of Iran are also being updated. Strategists at the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, in Tampa, Florida, have been asked to revise the military’s war plan, providing for a maximum ground and air invasion of Iran. Updating the plan makes sense, whether or not the Administration intends to act, because the geopolitics of the region have changed dramatically in the last three years. Previously, an American invasion force would have had to enter Iran by sea, by way of the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman; now troops could move in on the ground, from Afghanistan or Iraq. Commando units and other assets could be introduced through new bases in the Central Asian republics.

Considering the level of U.S. commitment likely to be required in Iraq for the foreseeable future, international skepticism regarding U.S. unilateral action, and the difficulty in establishing reliable human intelligence networks in police states (see Iraq for proof on that...), I find it unlikely that plans for attacking Iran are as high on the list as Hersh implies throughout the article. I also would estimate that it is common sense for the military to seek to gather its own intelligence on Iran's WMD capabilities after the poor quality of information provided by the CIA on Iraq.

Rather than providing deep insight into a planned invasion of Iran - or a planned dispatch of "hit teams" across the Middle East, I think he has stepped into the midst of a bureaucratic tussle that has been waged between the CIA and DoD since shortly after Rumsfeld became SecDef. Both entities believe covert actions belong firmly in their hands - the Agency because it assumes it has better-trained operatives and DoD because they believe Agency efforts at covert action have, in the past, created situations where DoD has been forced to intervene or take over because of Agency mistakes. Additionally, DoD planners believe they have a better oversight system and better checks and balances for operations that involve the use of force.

Because of the bitterness of the debate and the many special interests within both entities that are threatened by a change in the status quo, the gloves have come off for both sides. Each is willing to assume the worst of the other and present hyperbolic scenarios in which the world will end because of blunders made by "the other guys."

Hersh has waded into this bureaucratic battle without a complete understanding of the full context...and because of this is likely to fall easily into line with those offering a story that most closely corresponds with his own worldview.

In that worldview, neo-cons are in complete control of the DoD, angling to take over (or remove from a position of influence) the CIA, and anxious to make war with everyone within reach. These are dangerous assumptions.

From my perspective, I see two agencies engaged in a bitter turf battle that has more to do with enemies they see across the street in Washington than in actions being planned against possible enemies abroad. The military and intelligence community have yet to determine how to advance in the post-9/11 world. The sort of leaks gathered by Hersh give us more of an insight regarding the extent of the debate being waged within Washington than insight into American action abroad.

If, however, Hersh has accurately gathered information regarding current military reconnaisance operations in Iran, he has once again placed the lives of Americans in danger in the name of scoring a scoop.

A note to viewers at home: when a "top intelligence official" is quoted providing "information" on DoD operations:

In my interviews, I was repeatedly told that the next strategic target was Iran. “Everyone is saying, ‘You can’t be serious about targeting Iran. Look at Iraq,’” the former intelligence official told me. “But they say, ‘We’ve got some lessons learned—not militarily, but how we did it politically. We’re not going to rely on agency pissants.’ No loose ends, and that’s why the C.I.A. is out of there.”

...that is much akin to a "top Democratic official" providing "information" on Republican strategies (or vice-versa). In other words, we have to understand the natural bias behind such statements.

Hersh also touches some of the military leadership's dislike for Rumsfeld:

Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have called for Rumsfeld’s dismissal, and he is not widely admired inside the military. Nonetheless, his reappointment as Defense Secretary was never in doubt.

A valid point. However, much of the military anger directed toward Rumsfeld stems from his decision to reassert civilian control over the military. He has done so by stripping regional CinCs of responsibilities and authority (a step Hersh SHOULD be applauding, considering his biases), by pushing for new ways of thinking from stubborn generals who have resisted change since the end of the Cold War, and by questioning the assertions of general officers when they sought to defend the status quo. Not all of Rumsfeld's choices in his battle with top brass have been particularly wise, by the way. But he is making the effort, and finding himself in much the same position as McNamara when he took similar steps to wrest the idea of "winning" a nuclear conflict away from the likes of General LeMay.

While his research into supposed U.S. machinations has been thorough, he often seems to accept at face value Iranian steps at the negotiation table:

Iran has agreed to temporarily halt its enrichment programs, which generate fuel for nuclear power plants but also could produce weapons-grade fissile material. (Iran claims that such facilities are legal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or N.P.T., to which it is a signator, and that it has no intention of building a bomb.) But the goal of the current round of talks, which began in December in Brussels, is to persuade Tehran to go further, and dismantle its machinery. Iran insists, in return, that it needs to see some concrete benefits from the Europeans—oil-production technology, heavy-industrial equipment, and perhaps even permission to purchase a fleet of Airbuses. (Iran has been denied access to technology and many goods owing to sanctions.)

...without pointing out the numerous issues that have arisen as the IAEA catches Iran time and again in lies, half-truths, and cover-ups.

Considering statements such as this:

A retired senior C.I.A. official, one of many who left the agency recently, told me that he was familiar with the assessments, and confirmed that Iran is known to be having major difficulties in its weapons work. He also acknowledged that the agency’s timetable for a nuclear Iran matches the European estimates—assuming that Iran gets no outside help. “The big wild card for us is that you don’t know who is capable of filling in the missing parts for them,” the recently retired official said. “North Korea? Pakistan? We don’t know what parts are missing.”

...it would seem that an aggressive human intelligence program remains extremely important in countering (or at least understanding) Iranian intentions. The unstated idea running beneath Hersh's words seems to be that this is invalid and unacceptable U.S. behavior - at least as long as its being run by DoD as opposed to the CIA.

As Hersh begins to wander off-topic, we come across this gem:

The agreement comes at a time when Musharraf, according to a former high-level Pakistani diplomat, has authorized the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons arsenal. “Pakistan still needs parts and supplies, and needs to buy them in the clandestine market,” the former diplomat said. “The U.S. has done nothing to stop it.”
Considering that Pakistan's program has relied extensively on Chinese and North Korean expertise, what is it that the U.S. could feasibly do? What actions taken against Pakistan or China would likely be effective? No answer is provided.

Hersh moves on to provide point and counterpoint ref the effects of a limited strike to reduce Iran's nuclear capability. While giving "equal air time" to both sides' arguments, it's clear where his beliefs fall:

The government consultant told me that the hawks in the Pentagon, in private discussions, have been urging a limited attack on Iran because they believe it could lead to a toppling of the religious leadership. “Within the soul of Iran there is a struggle between secular nationalists and reformers, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the fundamentalist Islamic movement,” the consultant told me. “The minute the aura of invincibility which the mullahs enjoy is shattered, and with it the ability to hoodwink the West, the Iranian regime will collapse”—like the former Communist regimes in Romania, East Germany, and the Soviet Union. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz share that belief, he said.

“The idea that an American attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would produce a popular uprising is extremely illinformed,” said Flynt Leverett, a Middle East scholar who worked on the National Security Council in the Bush Administration. “You have to understand that the nuclear ambition in Iran is supported across the political spectrum, and Iranians will perceive attacks on these sites as attacks on their ambitions to be a major regional player and a modern nation that’s technologically sophisticated.” Leverett, who is now a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution, warned that an American attack, if it takes place, “will produce an Iranian backlash against the United States and a rallying around the regime.”

On this, however, I tend to agree with him. While there is a great deal of tension within Iran, there is not a great deal of enthusiasm regarding U.S. intervention. Nuclear programs engender a great deal of national pride. Destroying such a program alone (which is all the U.S. is currently capable of even considering) will not bring down the Iranian regime. This article from the NY Times, while hinting at popular discontent with the resources committed to Iran's nuclear program, doesn't convince me they are ready to rise against the government in response to U.S. attacks.

Moving on, Hersh covers the CIA's argument regarding why they are more suited to covert operations:

Giraldi, who served three years in military intelligence before joining the C.I.A., said that he was troubled by the military’s expanded covert assignment. “I don’t think they can handle the cover,” he told me. “They’ve got to have a different mind-set. They’ve got to handle new roles and get into foreign cultures and learn how other people think. If you’re going into a village and shooting people, it doesn’t matter,” Giraldi added. “But if you’re running operations that involve finesse and sensitivity, the military can’t do it. Which is why these kind of operations were always run out of the agency.” I was told that many Special Operations officers also have serious misgivings.

I think Giraldi fails to understand how unprepared most Agency field officers are for running paramilitary-type operations in foreign cultures. I'm not sure why he thinks an Agency officer with a four or six year degree in economics or foreign policy would be more suited for managing such operations than a military professional who has spent most of his adult career interacting with foreign cultures and foreign militaries. In the end, such covert operations are so difficult to coordinate and execute, that planning typically becomes more an exercise in naysaying. In most cases, that's probably a good thing. And in most cases, I think military professionals are more qualified in judging something to be too difficult to execute than Agency personnel.

When all is said and done, we are left with a great deal more conjecture and speculation than is provided in Newseek's "Salvadoran Option" article - but little proof of anything beyond the fact that the Pentagon and CIA are battling for control of covert operations and the administration has chosen to ensure they have at least some sort of military option should it come down to that with Iran.

UPDATE 2:

I found this link regarding a story from the beginning of the month regarding Iranian accusations of U.S. spy planes flying near their nuclear facilities....

UPDATE 3:

The Pentagon has issued its official response to the report here. Some highlights:

Mr. Hersh’s source(s) feed him with rumor, innuendo, and assertions about meetings that never happened, programs that do not exist, and statements by officials that were never made.
A sampling from this article alone includes:

  • The post-election meeting he describes between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not happen.

  • The only civilians in the chain-of-command are the President and the Secretary of Defense, despite Mr. Hersh’s confident assertion that the chain of command now includes two Department policy officials. His assertion is outrageous, and constitutionally specious.

  • Arrangements Mr. Hersh alleges between Under Secretary Douglas Feith and Israel, government or non-government, do not exist. Here, Mr. Hersh is building on links created by the soft bigotry of some conspiracy theorists. This reflects poorly on Mr. Hersh and the New Yorker.

  • Mr. Hersh cannot even keep track of his own wanderings. At one point in his article, he makes the outlandish assertion that the military operations he describes are so secret that the operations are being kept secret even from U.S. military Combatant Commanders. Mr. Hersh later states, though, that the locus of this super-secret activity is at the U.S. Central Command headquarters, evidently without the knowledge of the commander if Mr. Hersh is to be believed.

UPDATE 4:

The Winds of Change.NET's Winds of War for Monday includes a few topics on Iran. One wonders if news of "alleged" American activity near Iranian nuclear sites will be enough for the Iranian government to once again delay IAEA inspections of facilities such as those listed in the Winds of Change story:

IRAN REPORTS



UPDATE 5:

American Pundit offers similar criticism of Hersh's "revelations" - and the risks they may pose to Americans - on his site:

Had Hersh uncovered preparations for an invasion, my reaction to his report would be different. But publishing information about covert operations - and probably endangering the lives of operatives and contacts still in-country - is traitorous on the part of whoever leaked the info, and completely irresponsible on Hersh's part for publishing it.

UPDATE 6:

Roger Simon wonders if, perhaps, Hersh isn't being played by the Administration in its ongoing efforts to keep Iran in check. While I happen to think this is more a matter of Hersh being played by disgruntled civil servants who want to make everyone but themselves look bad, I certainly agree with the idea that Hersh falls far too easily for any evidence he's given that supports his worldview:

Sometimes it seems as if Seymour Hersh -- the seeming bete noire of the Bush administration -- has an open "leak line" from disgruntled CIA agents and surly State Department officials permanently plugged into his ear. When I heard about his latest infusion of goo in The New Yorker this morning, to wit that the US is spying on Iranian nuclear installations and trying to figure out what to do about them (planning special ops, air raids, etc.), I thought "Here he goes again, leaking top secret information!" But then I thought - duh, what top secret information? Is it possible that any US administration, Democrat or Republican, at this juncture in history would not be directing its intelligence agencies to take a long hard look at Iranian nukes and game plan how to deal with them?

Cold Fury offers a grain of salt regarding Mr. Hersh:

Moreover, Hersh himself, in an interview with The Progressive, once admitted that: “If the standard for being fired was being wrong on a story, I would have been fired long ago.”

So when Seymour Hersh writes, an extra-large grain of salt is called for.

Matt Yglesias takes a similar stand to mine on the deeper meaning behind the article:

The interesting material in Hersh's story (and, indeed, this is what the bulk of the word count is dedicated to) has to do with efforts to step up covert operations around the world and shift the locus of such activities out of the CIA and toward the Pentagon. It's a bit hard to know what to make of all that. I think it's clear that there is a need for an increased focus on small-scale, largely covert action.
Update:

Gregory at the Belgravia Dispatch further poo-poos the notion that the neo-con movement is gaining strength within the Bush administration.


Posted by Tim at 6:24 AM

No comments:

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)