Iraq and avoiding the dreaded "C" word (Updated)

While waiting to get a prescription filled on Yongsan today, I had the chance to sit down and watch CNN for about half an hour or so.

Perhaps because of the succesfully completed Palestinian elections, perhaps because Brad and Jen's split has distracted us from such issues as disaster relief in SE Asia, perhaps because violence continues in Iraq; the issue of the day was upcoming elections there, the 'threat' of civil war, and the legitimacy of whatever government emerges from the elections.

Of those presenting their opinions regarding election delays and legitimacy, only one struck on a point so often overlooked (at least in the sources I've seen) by the mainstream media. The U.S. cannot afford to delay elections (nor can the interim Iraqi government) because to do so would "open a second front" as militant Shiite factions once again took to armed resistance (as happened in April of 2004). To the Iraqi Shia, this vote is about establishing a political parallel to their simple population majority. It is the ONLY reason they tolerate U.S. occupation. If the election is delayed, that tolerance will slip rapidly away.

I also listened to numerous commentators dance around the issue of civil war within Iraq.

George Orwell tells us in "Politics and the English Language" that, "[the] great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turn as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms...."

Why do I bring George into the discussion? Quite simple, really. Firstly, there IS a civil war being waged within Iraq. Right now. Go ask members of the Iraqi military, police and interior ministry. Go ask families of the insurgents. According to this Brookings Institute Index (PDF), the "[estimated] number of Iraqi police killed January 1, 2004 -September 28, 2004" is 750. A further 1,500 security force recruits have been killed since May of 2003.

As for Iraqi civilians, (putting aside shrill reports of 100,000 deaths) the Brookings report estimates "IRAQI CIVILIANS KILLED AS A RESULT OF ACTS OF WAR SINCE MAY 2003 - Total as of December 31, 2004: 4,540-5,783."

Their estimate on car bombing casualties:

Total as of January 9, 2005:
Mass casualty bombings: 174
Killed: 1,835
Wounded: 4,257

The number of insurgents detained or killed per month has bounced between 750 and 3000 since May of 2003. Yes, most of those killed or detained were killed or detained by Coalition/U.S. forces but the point remains: large numbers of Iraqis are being killed, wounded, and captured while in direct combat with each other. This, to me, is civil war.

What the U.S. wants but euphemistically avoids mentioning, is a civil war with a successful conclusion. That's the real point behind the elections. A more legitimate Iraqi government will likely be seen as more worth defending by common Iraqis (almost certainly Shia in particular). The stated U.S. policy of "making Iraqis responsible for their own security" MEANS "you guys go win the civil war." It's that simple.

I read this from an interview with Brent Scowcroft in the Jan 6th Post:

Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser for President George H.W. Bush and a leading figure in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, said yesterday that he has grown pessimistic about prospects for stability and democracy in Iraq, a view increasingly expressed by other foreign policy figures in both parties.

"The Iraqi elections, rather than turning out to be a promising turning point, have the great potential for deepening the conflict," Scowcroft said. He said he expects increased divisions between Shiite and Sunni Muslims after the Jan. 30 elections, when experts believe the government will be dominated by the majority Shiites.

Scowcroft predicted "an incipient civil war" would grip Iraq and said the best hope for pulling the country from chaos would be to turn the U.S. operation over to NATO or the United Nations -- which, he said, would not be so hostilely viewed by Iraqis.

Now I question some of Brent's assumptions here, obviously.

#1 - there is already a civil war. The problem is not enough folks are on the side of the government at this point.

#2 - NATO and/or the UN will never take this operation over. NATO doesn't have the manpower (especially without considering the U.S. - which would continue to dominate troop numbers under a NATO force) and the UN has an abysmal record of peacemaking in hostile environments. Whenever peacekeeping has turned to difficult peacemaking, the UN has had to rely on a NATO power to set things right.

If NATO and the UN can't do it and the U.S. has lost too much credibility among Iraqis (a valid point in much of the Sunni Triangle), that leaves only a strong Iraqi government to wage a successful civil war.

There are no other realistic options. We don't have the manpower, resources, or harsh counter-insurgency mentality to crush this uprising on our own. And to do so would only create a situation where Iraqis feel there is no one to blame but the United States. Until they accept that security is in their hands and that they are already waging a civil war which they must win, there is only so much the U.S. can do.

In essence, the U.S. has two choices at this point: delay elections and attempt to suppress a rapidly broadening insurgency supported by the majority faction within Iraq; get what we can from the elections and attempt to make this into MORE of a civil war than it is at present.

Rather than running from the term "civil war," we should be embracing it...and ensuring that the right faction comes out on top.

Mike Ubaldi has more on uBlog regarding Western hand-wringing over the nature of the war in Iraq. While I think more mistakes were made than he admits, I agree with the notion that people are denying the nature of the war, the nature of inventing mistakes made in waging it, and the refusal to accept it for what it truly is. Although he disputes my contention regarding an ongoing civil war by pointing to "best estimates" of the number of insurgents, we have to keep in mind that insurgent strength has held strong or increased throughout the occupation - at the same time it was suffering losses between 750 and 3000 per month. While there may be only 10,000 ACTIVE fighters right now, the base of support for those fighters and the number of fighters who have served and died is much higher - giving us a better indication of the level of support for the insurgency within the Sunni Triangle.

Eric at Total Information Awareness has an excellent take on why we have little choice but to hold the elections on 30 Jan...and mentions something that is also often ignored in the MSM. There is every chance that the winning government will tell the U.S. "Thanks...but no thanks" and demand a withdrawal date for U.S. forces.

Hindrocket at Powerline discusses MSM's distress over the possibility that portions of the population (many of whom implicitly support this small-scale civil war...) in Iraq will not be able to vote. He refers to other elections held in countries torn by strife - to include the United States. As he says, "In 1864 no one at all voted in the one-third of the United States that was then in rebellion, but to my knowledge no one argues that the re-election of President Lincoln was therefore 'invalid.'"

An excellent point to remember.

Steve Vincent of Red Zone fame dissects an article from the NY Times and, in so doing, arrives at many of the same conclusions I mention above (and that we see mentioned in the comments below). Bottom line: Sunni resistance leaders are not likely to come around to accept elections - they have too much to lose. As a result, we must ensure the elections take place, the new government receives all of the support it needs from the U.S. (even if that includes a withdrawal timetable), and we must ensure that this civil war ends with "the good guys" on top.

Further proof that pigs might just fly: I find myself in agreement with Juan Cole as he delivers his "take" on the upcoming elections (and why they must take place). As he says,

Every path forward has costs. Postponing the elections leaves in place the increasingly unpopular Allawi interim government, populated by old CIA assets, which destroyed its credibility by acting as a cheering section for the US destruction of Fallujah. It could be argued that the Sunni Arab guerrilla war benefits from the perceived illegitimacy of the Allawi government, which has disappointed those who hoped it might restore order.

Postponement would risk radicalizing Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most respected leader in Iraq, who has already once demonstrated his willingness to call the faithful into the streets in the hundreds of thousands if he did not get his way on one person, one vote elections on a fast timetable. A postponement without his acquiescence would be dangerous in the extreme.

While I'd argue his statement regarding credibility lost by the government during the Fallujah campaign (the government never had any credibility within the circles most distressed by Fallujah to begin with. Fallujah was "Insurgent Central" and has been ever since the first American occupation force chose to avoid nipping it in the bud shortly after the invasion), I certainly don't argue his assessment of the delicate balance we now have the the Shiite majority.

UPDATE:

Armed Liberal gets more in depth while discussing American reasons for staying the course in Iraq - although I noticed no reference to how the U.S. should respond to a request for withdrawal from a government we consider legitimate.

UPDATE 2:

Deacon from Powerline covers a bit more on the "realist" approach being presented by Washington Post reporters and Scowcroft:

On Tim Russert''s show yersterday, two Washington Post veterans, Dana Priest and Robin Wright, presented their preferred approach to coping with the insurgency in Iraq. Under this approach, the soon-to-be new Iraqi government would go to the U.N., present itself as the elected representatives of the nation of Iraq, and ask for U.N. assistance in maintaining order. At the same time, the U.S. would agree to let the U.N. take over and would play only whatever small role in the defense of Iraq the U.N. deemed appropriate. With the U.S. out of the way, the insurgents would lose their status as a heroic resistance and the situation might materially improve. Priest and Wright call this approach "realist," on the grounds that it has been mooted by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, who belong to the realist school of foreign policy.

Labels aside, it's difficult to imagine a less realistc policy. Priest and Wright acknowledged only one difficulty -- the U.S. might not agree to step aside because doing so would go against everything President Bush has stood for. They should have added that the U.N. will never agree to replace us because doing so would violate what it stands for. Indeed, the U.N. pulled out of Iraq the minute that violence was directed against its personnel. This suggests the third fatal flaw in the realism of Priest and Wright -- the Iraqis would have to be crazy to prefer having their security protected by the U.N. rather than the U.S.

Iraq