On April 30, 1975, "[t]wo years after a cease-fire agreement promised peace in Vietnam; ten years after America sent combat troops into its longest war; twenty years after an international conference divided Vietnam; thirty years after the Communists launched their struggle for Vietnam's independence" (Source), the failed American intervention came to an end as the North Vietnamese captured Saigon. So ended the world's first so-called "living room war." Vietnam has served as a defining experience for a wide number of politicians, professional soldiers, scholars, and activists. Each of these separate groups, based on their own experiences during the Vietnam era - and their own pre-conceived notions - has developed a unique set of "lessons learned" from the conflict – and many within each of these groups now seek to apply those lessons to American intervention in Iraq. Broadly defined, the three main lessons learned that are most generally applied today come from the journalistic perspective (the real story doesn't come from official sources), the military perspective (based around the Powell Doctrine), and the public perspective (here there are two contradicting lessons: once involved in a conflict, the public should support the war effort to its successful conclusion and, inversely, mass protests can affect public policy).
In attempting to apply these lessons (however contradictory and confusing they may be), the United States seeks to answer one question above all others: how does (or how can) an open society effectively wage war? Information technology, new reporting techniques (and perspectives), and ever-evolving public perceptions regarding what falls within the citizen's 'right to know' have all profoundly altered the notion of total war. Government has been largely stripped of its ability to filter and shape news from the war front. Instead, military and political leaders now struggle to develop new relationships with the press, with the public, and with its soldiers at the same time it attempts to militarily engage and defeat its enemies.
LESSONS FOR JOURNALISTS
While Korea was the first war fought during the television era, the medium hadn't developed a wide enough base within America to serve as a tool for delivering war news quickly to an American public. That public was still conditioned to expect limited, largely positive war coverage from its WWII experiences. Combined with the difficulty in providing anything but wired reports from the war front, journalism from Korea – although much freer from censorship than its WWII predecessor – was unable to create as deep an impact on American public opinion (or substantively deliver a message that contradicted the official U.S. government position on the war). In an era when anti-Communist paranoia ran exceptionally high, few editors were likely to sanction stories that questioned the larger meaning of the war or the generally held belief that America was unquestionably in the right when contrasted with its opponents. Instead, the central debate on Korea developed between political leaders attempting to discern how deeply the battle in Korea could be tied into the 'battle' against communism. This would change in Vietnam – although that change would develop slowly as reporters began to compare official messages more closely with their own experiences in an extended conflict.
The preponderance of early press coverage in Vietnam was largely positive – as it has typically been in all of America's wars:
For the first few years of the living room war most of the coverage was upbeat. It typically began with a battlefield roundup, written from wire reports based on the daily press briefing in Saigon--the "Five O'Clock Follies," as journalists called it--read by the anchor and illustrated with a battle map. These reports had a World War II feel to them--journalists no less than generals are prone to "fighting the last war"--with fronts and "big victories" and a strong sense of progress and energy (Source).
As the war dragged on – and as reporters traveling with military units began to see growing gaps between official proclamations and the truth as they saw it on the ground, the tone of coverage began to change. Because more reporters were producing more information – and this information was more readily available to yet other reporters, a consensus began to form that disputed official press releases. This gradual building of a base of knowledge separate from that provided by the military lead to such incidents as Walter Cronkite's report following the Tet Offensive in 1968:
Initially, Cronkite was something of a hawk on the Vietnam War, although his program did broadcast controversial segments such as Morley Safer's famous "Zippo lighter" report. However, returning from Vietnam after the Tet offensive Cronkite addressed his massive audience with a different perspective. "It seems now more certain than ever," he said, "that the bloody experience of Vietnam is a stalemate." He then urged the government to open negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Many observers, including presidential aide Bill Moyers speculated that this was a major factor contributing to President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision to offer to negotiate with the enemy and not to run for President in l968 (Source).
For members of the press, broadcasts such as Cronkite's represented a watershed event. Wartime information gathered by reporters, disseminated by the mass media, and seen by ever-increasing American audiences was directly contradicting official U.S. government positions – and doing so in a manner that seemed to affect policy. For journalists, the lesson seemed clear: the truth often comes from sources other than the government. The truth is required for the American people to participate in democracy. The truth may require a more neutral stance toward the United States than most American war reporters had ever considered in the past. In Iraq today, journalists struggle to balance official press releases with unprecedented firsthand access to the battlefield (embeds), reports from Arab journalists providing a view through the 'enemy's eyes,' and their own desire to affect policy without appearing to lean too hard toward one side or the other. Thus far, the result is a pool of information so disparate that journalists and media consumers can find well-researched stories with extensive anecdotal evidence to support either pro-war, anti-war, or any other stance one chooses to take. The journalistic lessons from Vietnam (as applied to Iraq) have created new stories, new viewpoints, and new techniques for gathering and delivering information but have failed thus far to decisively affect policy or provide a clear voice describing the situation on the ground.
LESSONS FOR MILITARY LEADERS
For senior military officers, the practical, war-fighting lessons taken away from Vietnam can typically be summarized by reviewing the so-called Powell Doctrine:
It has been argued that the Doctrine follows from principles laid out by Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Defense and as such Powell's former boss:
· Is a vital US interest at stake?
· Will we commit sufficient resources to win?
· Are the objectives clearly defined?
· Will we sustain the commitment?
· Is there reasonable expectation that the public and Congress will support the operation?
· Have we exhausted our other options? (Source)
Professional military men have looked for the most easily discerned lessons from Vietnam for both senior and junior-level officers and NCOs. Translated to Iraq, military leaders such as H.R. McMaster have questioned U.S. actions early in the Vietnam War that bear a strong similarity to U.S. actions toward Iraq since the end of the first Gulf War (and prior to the 2003 invasion):
There is a grave danger associated with calling the bombing of another country anything but war. During the period in which Vietnam became an American war, Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara created the illusion that attacks on North Vietnam were alternatives to war rather than war itself. Bombing, particularly from the perspective of the receiving end, is not "communication." Bombs result in death and destruction. After engaging in acts of war against another nation, there exists a degree of uncertainty in terms of the enemy's reactions. War inspires an unpredictable psychology and evokes strong emotions that defy systems analysis quantification (Source).
The general consensus among military senior leadership centers on the belief that clearly articulated strategic goals must serve as the base for planning and executing military operations. For these leaders, such a clearly articulated goal was never apparent in Vietnam.
At the junior level, the advent of a professional army (one of the most important contributions of post-Vietnam leaders), has created an environment in which increasing degrees of operational freedom can be given to company and platoon-level leadership – along with the information tools required to effectively utilize this newfound freedom. Without the professionalization of the force, such freedom would be useless – lost on conscripts and hastily-trained junior leaders without the institutional knowledge to carry out decentralized operations.
Another of the key strategic and military lessons learned from Vietnam centers on the creation of a legitimate host-nation counterinsurgency force – and a government capable of garnering popular support. Although small-scale U.S. efforts (such as those undertaken by Special Forces units and some Marines) in Vietnam created effective local counter-insurgency forces, the large-scale efforts were far less successful. In Iraq, efforts to build both an effective host-nation force and a legitimate government continue apace. In contrast to America's Vietnam experience, the Iraqi elections are an effort to create a government that has local appeal and popular support as its most defining feature. Tolerating a local government that may broadly disagree with the United States as it seeks to appeal to its constituency is a bold divergence from the past.
As a broader theme, the practical lessons applied from Vietnam for the military and political leaders of the United States revolve around placing greater authority into the hands of those who, in the past, have simply been told what to do. This applies both to American military members and the Iraqi people in general. As such, it is a bold gamble that relies on the abilities and attitudes of the common man and woman rather than political or military elites.
LESSONS FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC
The American public most clearly demonstrates the split perceptions created by the Vietnam War. For the anti-war movement, Vietnam was a demonstration of 'people power' – proof that a vocal minority could sway government policy and the broader views of the general population through activism, civil disobedience, and large-scale protests targeted at key events and institutions. For the Nixon-defined 'silent majority' who uncomfortably watched a social movement based on what they deemed unpatriotic ideals, the lesson is far different. Holding the WWII public reaction to war as its patriotic example, this large block of the citizenry expected (and expects) honest debate and a firm rationale for the use of force…but places loyalty to the country, its leaders, and its soldiers at the fore once a conflict has begun. This dichotomy of views is perhaps best explained thusly: for the anti-war movement, U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was a patriotic victory. For the more socially conservative 'silent majority,' U.S. withdrawal was a defeat sparked by the actions of disloyal citizens. Although this divide has lain dormant beneath the American political scene for most of the intervening years (flaring up during the early '80s Central American conflicts and again briefly during the run-up to Desert Storm in '90 and '91), the 2003 war in Iraq – and the presidential election of 2004 have served to both widen this gap and bring it to a position of prominence not seen since the late '60s. Taken to its extreme form, many believe that social activism utilizing the new tools of the Information Revolution has created a so-called "second superpower" composed of world public opinion – and that this superpower will gradually gain the power to dictate terms to nation-states. Interestingly, much of the Bush administration's efforts at spreading democracy are built atop the notion that, if given the choice, people will fight and die for a chance to live in freedom. In other words, the policy is based upon the same faith in grass roots movements expressed by the anti-war movement that opposes him.
CONCLUSION:
David Fromkin best sums up the difficulty in applying clear lessons learned from Vietnam with this excerpt from Foreign Affairs Magazine:
The underlying condition for using historical episodes as a unifying metaphor enabling us to better understand new situations is that a consensus about the past must exist. Otherwise, illuminating though the past may be for each individual in arriving at a private understanding of events, it does not help in persuading others so as to arrive at a common understanding (Source).
As interesting as the utter lack of consensus from the Vietnam War is the increased flow of information available from Iraq. In a sense, the years required to form and harden opinions on Vietnam have been reduced to considerably less in Iraq. Onlookers build on preconceived notions left over from Vietnam and have access to as much information in one day as was likely generated within a month (or more) during the Vietnam conflict. And this information is presented from a bewildering array of angles – all based on anecdotal evidence that, if viewed in isolation, is generally factually correct. The new "lessons learned" from Iraq are as disparate and as passionately believed as the lessons from Vietnam – but little has been accomplished outside of allowing "each individual [to arrive] at a private understanding of events" (ibid).
Vietnam Syndrome
Iraq
Populism
