Two steps forward...how many back?

New Leaders Of Sunnis Make Gains In Influence

While I had often previously pondered how long it would take until some portion of the Sunni population in Iraq realized their best move would be to work with the US, it remains difficult to see where this will all lead. Much of it depends on how willing the national government is to make concessions in order to solidify peace - not the sort of large scale concessions discussed during the last round of "benchmarks" but small steps like accepting Sunni "concerned local citizens" as a legitimate force in creating conditions for longer-term peace. That, of course, won't happen if either the Sunni militia movements push too hard against Shiite forces and civilians (because they feel that they have the backing of the US) or if Sadr and his leaders decide to throw out their cease fire and jump back into the fight with both fists.

Why does the closing song from "Life of Brian" come to mind...?

I know...there's only so much humor one can find in the conflict in Iraq...but this one just brings to mind thoughts of Life of Brian. You know the scene I'm talking about....

CAMPAIGN FOR FREE GALILEE:

Shhh! Shh. Shhh. Shh.

DEADLY DIRK:

Campaign for Free Galilee.

FRANCIS:

Oh. Uh, People's Front of Judea. Officials.

DEADLY DIRK:

Oh.

FRANCIS:

What's your group doing here?

DEADLY DIRK:

We're going to kidnap Pilate's wife, take her back, issue demands.

FRANCIS:

So are we.

DEADLY DIRK:

What?

FRANCIS:

That's our plan!

DEADLY DIRK:

We were here first!

Giving Sadr the credit he's due

So Muqtada al-Sadr is back a bit more prominently in the news over the last few days. Once again, he is urging Shiites (in general) and his followers (specifically) to "resist" the American occupation. And, once again, I see a hint of rejoicing amongst those who stubbornly refuse to understand that Sadr and his militia learned their lessons from the hard fighting of 2004. Yes...from a military perspective, Sadr's militia took a drubbing in 2004 - both in Najaf and in Sadr City. No...they have not chosen to fight in that manner since - despite all of his proclamations, political maneuvering, and paramilitary activity. Instead, the militia has secured the populace from which it draws support, aggressively moved against the population from which it feels most threatened (Sunnis), waged a shadowy campaign against US and British forces relying on effective roadside bombs, and undermined US efforts to build popular support with the Iraqi Shia community - while still benefiting from the heavy Shia hand in government.

So...the same day we see some folks reveling in the "fact" that Sadr wants to "get it on," we also see what "getting it on" means in a war that is much more communication and political maneuvering as it is fighting:

Large crowds of men, women and children, holding flags and anti-US banners, gathered in Najaf and the nearby twin city of Kufa for the protest which is also seen as a show of strength for the cleric who himself has been in self-exile for more than two months, an AFP correspondent said.

[...]

Members of Sadr's movement were seen guiding the crowds, while Iraqi police and army soldiers guarded key checkpoints in and around Najaf and Kufa.

[...]

The cleric, who launched two bloody rebellions against US forces in 2004, is known for his anti-US stance and has emerged as a powerful force in the present Shiite-led Iraqi government.

His political bloc has 32 lawmakers in the 275-member Iraqi parliament and six cabinet ministers in Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's embattled government.

What does he give us to swing at? Where is a target for us to engage? Who has better learned the lessons of this war?

Sadr's boys reading the tea leaves?

Sadr Urges Followers to Resist U.S. Forces; Thousands Rally - washingtonpost.com:

Interesting words from a subordinate commander within the Mahdi Militia:

"'People are becoming thirsty for peace, for security, right now,' Hussein said. 'We all depend on the government and the security forces.'"

U.S. success or failure will likely hinge on the truth of his words - and the ability of US and ISF to be seen as the providers of that security.

Time will tell

Early progress in Baghdad crackdown - Conflict in Iraq - MSNBC.com

The key to success may rest in the deployment and activities of increased trooops - more so than the increase itself. If so, then it might be possible to continue improving conditions within Baghdad. If that can be maintained for a long enough period of time, eventually Iraqi leaders might find it more beneficial to advance their causes through the political system rather than through the barrel of a gun or the fanaticism of a suicide bomber.

We shall see.

Taking a walk with Sisyphus.

US commander strolls streets of contested city, eating ice cream and talking progress - International Herald Tribune

The article I highlighted yesterday dealt very specifically with conditions in Hit...as does this one. Once again, we see an effort to reestablish some sort of rule of law within the city. As is the unfortunate norm, it's almost as if 1-36 didn't spend a year there trying to do the same. Much as had been the case when 1-36 replaced a Marine MEU that had "succeeded" in its counterinsurgency campaign.

Combined, these reports easily lead one to view the COIN campaign in Iraq as a Sisyphean challenge. For a more optimistic spin on things, check out this Wikipedia entry highlighting US military efforts in Hit...and then sink back to the realization that all of the good work done there previously is now being done again - as if for the first time - by the next unit in the hopper - 2/7 IN from 3rd ID.

My personal belief, putting aside strategic and grand strategic issues, is that the method(s) of unit rotation employed by the US Military in Iraq prevent long term success. As each unit rotates in, Sisyphus' boulder rolls back down the hill while they figure out how to push it back up without getting killed in the process. Then, as they start to get some momentum, bam. Time to rotate. Time for the next unit to start from scratch. Hrmph.

An article from last September...

In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths - washingtonpost.com

...that highlights the difficulties American troops will likely encounter as they try to shift tactics more toward the touchy-feely rapport/reconnaissance work of Special Forces - but find themselves hampered by a training mindset and temperament that prefers direct conflict as a means to achieve objectives. The difficulty: military objectives can only lay the groundwork for political conditions. If those military operations create conditions that hamper political progress, they become meaningless at best and counter-productive at worst.

American units practice what the manual preaches

Soldiers Shift to Baghdad Outposts - washingtonpost.com

The outposts reflect one of the first efforts in Baghdad to actually practice what our COIN manuals (even the older manual that has recently been replaced) have always preached...life in a counterinsurgency campaign is intelligence gathering, beat walking, and relationship building...all intended to provide enough clarity so offensive operations strike at the right targets, at the right time, without the operational and strategic repercussions that often accompany poorly judged tactical targeting.

Good stuff...as long as all of the participants get it. At a higher level, I think that understanding is developing:

"We're going to get more information, and when we get that information, we can target better, and if we target better, we can get more bad guys off the street and we don't hurt the locals while we do it," he said. "And the other part of getting out here, and I think it's something we've missed in the mission for a while . . . is our purpose to protect the people."

Down at the troop level (where, ultimately, it must be understood)? Jury's still out on that one:

"These little combat outposts, they are more exposed: Your routes in here are very limited, and they're definitely watching us," Staff Sgt. Marcel Weaver, 35, said of the insurgents operating in the neighborhood around the base. A grenade "attack is coming, I can guarantee that."

How do you balance the tactical necessity of force protection with the long-term operational/strategic necessity for securing the population and building intelligence through constant presence? Especially with an army that doesn't want to be trained to do that? While American public opinion and political will wavers?

From the WaPost

Sunni Insurgents Ascendant in Iraq's Caldron of Violence - washingtonpost.com

Interesting split in strategies between the two main insurgent protagonists. The Shia lay low (likely in hopes of waiting out the surge...a lesson learned from the bloody 2004 battles with the Coalition?) while Sunni insurgent groups shoot to paint the surge as a failure - perhaps in the hope of driving the US out of Iraq before ISF (or Shia militias...or a merger of the two) are capable of dealing with them, creating the conditions for a failed state in which they are likely to retain more freedom of maneuver (as opposed to having the combined weight of the Iraqi state's security organs plus the Shia militias turned upon them). It'll be interesting to see who's gamble pays off here. I'd like to bet on the Shia simply because putting their heads down makes them more likely to get tied up into the political process if the surge manages to set the stage for it.

Imagine for a moment,

Imagine for a moment that you are a member of the Iraqi security forces. Perhaps you have joined because it was the only job available, perhaps because you formerly served under Saddam's regime, perhaps because you suffered at the old regime's hands and wish to prevent those abuses from happening again. To a certain degree, the reasons largely become irrelevant.

Imagine that your family has been terrorized, you have been threatened, and your friends and comrades have been killed. On the news, you hear repeatedly that the United States does not truly support a free Iraq. You hear that the insurgency is growing, that security forces grow more fearful rather than more assertive. It sinks in. You begin to question your role - and the future of your country.

Now imagine that you are assigned to provide security during the elections. Imagine that you are awakened to the silent majority's resolve as they file endlessly by to the polls, dismissing fears of attack. Imagine watching men and women of all ages, all beliefs, all ethnicities expressing their free will in the face of fear. Imagine that the initial flush of joy you felt when the old regime collapsed has returned...only now it is stiffened with a pride in your country and your countrymen.

Imagine how this will affect your actions when you next encounter those who choose violence over the rule of the law. Imagine, for a moment, physical courage bound with a burgeoning sense of duty, commitment, and pride.

Imagine that, Kos. Imagine that, "Professor" Cole. Imagine that, Mr. Moore. Just for a moment.

Update:

Exhibit A:

Despite 260 insurgent attacks - the highest level yet seen in one day - the "degree of lethality" was remarkably low, reflecting high readiness and morale among the Iraqi police and military units guarding the sites, the US diplomat said.

"In almost every case, Iraqi forces stopped the attacks."

Exhibit B:

Shuwayli threw his arms around the bomber and drove him backward about 50 feet into an intersection. The rush seemed to catch the suicide attacker by surprise. The bomber had a hand grenade but failed to throw it. A second or two passed before he detonated an explosive belt, police Lt. Col. Kadham Abbas said.

Update 2:

Steven Vincent from the Red Zone discusses winners, losers, and work yet to be done. As he says,

In the past, the homegrown Iraqi militants got a lot of mileage from their claims that they fought a "foreign occupation." Whatever little merit that argument possessed has vanished with the election: now the ex-Baathist Saddamites appear in their true light--fascists attempting to overturn a democratic government. At what temperature does the legitimacy of reactionaries burn? Fahrenheit 9-11.

Update 3:

Eric Martin at Total Information Awareness offers a realistic assessment of the (numerous) issues still to be addressed now that the elections are behind us. He also includes a number of great links to other takes on the election and their meaning (or lack thereof, for the more cynically minded).

Iraq
Elections