Reading this New York Times article prompted me to dig a little bit deeper into the background of both bin Laden's latest message and the assumptions behind Islamist/Fundamentalist anger at the United States.
Let me start by hitting the high points of the Times article:
The tape indicated that Mr. bin Laden has apparently moved the fomenting of a revolution in his Saudi homeland toward the top of his lengthy and ambitious wish list, which also includes the reversal of American foreign policy in the Middle East, the retreat of the American military from the Arabian Peninsula and the creation of a Palestinian homeland.
Other than a re-prioritization of goals (moving revolution in Saudi Arabia back toward the top of the agenda), we see little different from his past rants in the above statement. But the Times article continues with an analysis of the change in bin Laden's tone:
What intelligence officials and terrorism experts find particularly remarkable in his recent pronouncements is a shift in style from the raw anger and dark imagery of the post-9/11 days. They say he has subtly tempered his message, tone and even persona, presenting himself almost as an ambassador, as if he sees himself as an elder statesman for a borderless Muslim nation.
This shift to a more reasonable tone could, as the article suggests, indicates that bin Laden seeks to widen the appeal of his message now that he has established his "jihadi creds." In other words, he's shown he walks the walk. Now he may be grasping that true victory rests in appealing to the non-violent masses of Islam who dislike the United States but disagree with violence against civilians as a solution.
Mr. bin Laden's attempt to engage Americans is occurring while his message to drive the United States out of the Muslim world is resonating with those among the 1.2 billion Muslims who believe the Qaeda leader eloquently expresses their anger over the foreign policies of the United States and Israel. In recent years, he has emphasized the Palestinians' struggle. "His genius lies in identifying things that are easily visible and easily felt by most Muslims," Mr. Scheuer said. "He has found issues that are simple, and that Muslims see playing out on their televisions every day."
Jessica Stern, a Harvard professor who lectures on terrorism, said she was most surprised by Mr. bin Laden's detailed comments about the American economy. "It seemed as if he was trying to appeal to more moderate Muslims, who might have found his 1998 fatwa to kill all Americans morally repulsive," said Ms. Stern, the author of "Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill." "His message on this tape is not nearly as offensive. He talks about Americans having a choice - it is up to us to decide whether we will support a foreign policy that he says is bad for our economy and bad for the Islamic world."
Here we see the politician carefully crafting a message to build support with his constituents. Is bin Laden moving in a more logical manner for claiming a true leadership role among the worldwide Islamic community? Is such a role possible with the diversity of Islam today?
The Times article also elaborates on Saudi Arabia as a test case. If bin Laden can foment revolution there, he proves his leadership has expanded beyond that of an extremist. He becomes a mainstream Islamic leader with more clout than even Khomeini held after his ascension to power in 1979 Iran.
The U.S. Defense Science Board released a report [PDF file], dated from September of this year. The report shows a much greater grasp of the issues separating the U.S. public from the "Islamic public" than we typically see from either our government or our media sources. Here's a sampling from the report:
We call it a war on terrorism ― but Muslims in contrast see a history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents ― of which radical fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for restoration also represent, in their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within Islam.
If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the “apostate” regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward — and potentially dangerous — situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all Muslims and country-specific.
This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S. seeks to “dominate” and “weaken” the Muslim World. Not only is every American initiative and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intra-Islamic hostilities — but Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.
Therefore, in stark contrast to the Cold War, the United States today is not seeking to contain a threatening state/empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity — an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a “War on Terrorism.”
What does this report tell us? Disturbingly, it tells us that bin Laden's message has a market. And by toning his message down, he broadly expands that market.
I wrote a rather longish paper on the current Islamic resurgence earlier this year that I think covers many of these issues. Below is my shortened version that is heavy on the ideas I conveyed but short on the facts I used in supporting those ideas. I think it blends well with both the DSB report and the Times report regarding bin Laden's efforts to place himself in a leadership position within the Islamic community:
The roots of the current Islamic resurgence are buried in those Middle Eastern nations with the greatest Islamic history - nations whose actions and decisions have often had an impact far outside their immediate borders. Increasing oil prices created a surge of surplus funds in the Middle East's most conservative Islamic nations. At the same time, the Pan-Arabism of the region's most progressive states collapsed without achieving its vision of a united, secular, Arab nation. As reformers and radicals looked back upon pan-Arabism and its failures, they turned from secular solutions for government and sought instead to find answers within Islam's past.
The Islamic nature of the 1973 "Ramadan" war -- code-named "Badr" in reference to Prophet Muhammad's fabled battle against unbelievers -- combined with the greater comparative success of Arab forces (many Arabs will tell you today it was an outright victory), led many Muslims to view this as proof that Allah looked favorably upon those with faith. In contrast, Pan-Arabism, secularism, and Western ideas had led them away from Allah and resulted in the failures of 1967. Placed in perspective, the 1967 war served as the final nail in the coffin of Pan-Arabism while the 1973 war served as a launching point for the current Islamic resurgence.
The resurgence grew rapidly as Saudi Arabia's oil revenues flowed outward to Islamic causes and charities – both out of a genuine belief in the causes of Islam and as a means to satisfy their arch-conservative Ulema (the body of Islamic scholars that legitimizes al-Saud family rule). As the first cracks in the Saudi royal family’s own piety began to receive greater attention, the Iranian Islamic Republic arose from its revolution, offering a new, modernized and uncorrupted vision for Islamists the world over. Simultaneously, the war in Afghanistan provided opportunities for Arab Muslim countries to prove their devotion to the faith through charity and aid to the Mujahadeen. For a large number of young, frustrated Islamic men, tours in Afghanistan and Pakistan served to satisfy (and often build) their desire for jihad. Upon their return, they looked at the string of Islamic victories from 1973 through to the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and asked themselves, “What next?”
What they saw were corrupt governments that seemed (in their eyes) intent on abandoning Islam in attempts to appease the West. From their perspective, victory had come to those who showed the greatest piety and devotion to Islam. A powerful example had been set. For those who had sought success in the ways of the West, there had been only failure, oppressive rule, and unIslamic morality. For those who had placed their faith in Allah, there had been only victory – often against seemingly insurmountable odds. While the numbers of militants remains small in comparison to the Umma (Islamic community) as a whole, the masses of Islam have received the same message. The majority of Muslims have no desire to fight endlessly against infidels and the West – but they do seek an escape from poverty, oppressive governments that deny them their faith, and Western domination. For these masses, greater piety and a return to traditional values seem an obvious answer as they look back at the lessons of the past thirty years.
Since the end of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, several events have served to further bind the Islamic world community together, continuing the Islamic resurgence: continuing violence between Palestinians and Israelis; continued governmental repression as Arab leaders act to prevent a repeat of the Iranian revolution; the September 11, 2001 attacks on America; and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Equally importantly, members of the Umma increasingly take advantage of global communications technology to share ideas, views, goals, and concerns across any distance - thus turning regional issues into international concerns.
Regional differences, the practical reality of distance between states dominated by Muslims, and the majority belief among Muslims that war is not an acceptable answer preclude the idea of a single Islamic state. However, the resurgence of a Muslim identity that carries greater loyalty than the bonds to political bodies or nations, the global information revolution, and the weakening of authority this engenders in nation-states creates an environment in which the Umma serves as a powerful non-governmental organization capable of swaying the decisions of governments across the globe.
Update:
As Eric Martin elaborates here, AQ may have executed the classic one step forward, two steps back with both bin Laden's and Zarqawi's recents rants against democracy:
For his part, Bin Laden called on Iraqis to boycott the elections, and praised the efforts of Zarqawi. The language was actually quite strong:
"The constitution imposed by the American occupier (Paul) Bremer is blasphemous ... and anyone who takes part in this election consciously and willingly is an infidel," said the speaker, who sounded similar to previous bin Laden recordings.
"You have to be careful of those charlatans who, under the guise of Islamic parties, urge the people to take part in the election," he added. [emphasis added]
Zarqawi chimed in with his own declaration of war on the elections, calling the candidates "demi-idols" and those that participate "infidels" and threatening violence for all involved.
"We have declared a fierce war on this evil principle of democracy and those who follow this wrong ideology," said the speaker, who identified himself as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of the al-Qaida affiliate in Iraq. "Anyone who tries to help set up this system is part of it."
