Violence Leaves Young Iraqis Doubting Clerics - New York Times

Interesting. This one stirred some thoughts:

1. When's the last time we heard mention of Sistani? He held more sway over the Shia population of Iraq than any other single man for probably the first two years after the invasion. He seemed to lose a lot of influence during the general outbreak of sectarian violence in 2006. Will he regain support and stature now that people are looking for moderation? Or will he be painted with the same brush as other religious leaders and continue to be sidelined?

2. Does the American empowerment of different elements - such as Iraqi Security Forces and the Sheiks who are participating in the "Awakening" - dilute the power of religious leaders?

3. What will this mean for future elections in Iraq? Lower turnout because Iraqis are more dismissive of religious edicts to vote? Less backing for religious parties? Who would fill that void? Here's an interesting perspective on politics in Iraq - 2008 style.

4. How will Sadr, the master political opportunist, react? Will he minimize his (always questionable to begin with) religious credentials? Play up his role as a nationalist looking out for the good of Iraq? How much more would he have to crack down on his own organization to really convince Sunnis that he's serious about reconciliation?

Sadr's a pretty good weather vane for determining the future direction of Iraqi politics. His decision to extend his cease fire tells us a bit about his take on the primacy of politics over violence within Iraq - at least for the time being. And that's true regardless of whether you think the cease fire reduced violence in the first place or was merely a clever political ploy to increase his stature and protect his forces during the American surge.

NYT: War, Meet the 2008 Campaign

http://mobile.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/weekinreview/20gordon.xml

A great article - although one could argue he only really touches the surface of the issue. The bottom line (in my view): McCain is the only candidate to even begin touching on the realities of the war and how our next president will have to address it.

Two steps forward...how many back?

New Leaders Of Sunnis Make Gains In Influence

While I had often previously pondered how long it would take until some portion of the Sunni population in Iraq realized their best move would be to work with the US, it remains difficult to see where this will all lead. Much of it depends on how willing the national government is to make concessions in order to solidify peace - not the sort of large scale concessions discussed during the last round of "benchmarks" but small steps like accepting Sunni "concerned local citizens" as a legitimate force in creating conditions for longer-term peace. That, of course, won't happen if either the Sunni militia movements push too hard against Shiite forces and civilians (because they feel that they have the backing of the US) or if Sadr and his leaders decide to throw out their cease fire and jump back into the fight with both fists.

Why does the closing song from "Life of Brian" come to mind...?

I know...there's only so much humor one can find in the conflict in Iraq...but this one just brings to mind thoughts of Life of Brian. You know the scene I'm talking about....

CAMPAIGN FOR FREE GALILEE:

Shhh! Shh. Shhh. Shh.

DEADLY DIRK:

Campaign for Free Galilee.

FRANCIS:

Oh. Uh, People's Front of Judea. Officials.

DEADLY DIRK:

Oh.

FRANCIS:

What's your group doing here?

DEADLY DIRK:

We're going to kidnap Pilate's wife, take her back, issue demands.

FRANCIS:

So are we.

DEADLY DIRK:

What?

FRANCIS:

That's our plan!

DEADLY DIRK:

We were here first!

Nicely worded, but...

A link to the transcript of Obama's foreign policy speech. He does a good job of readdressing the threat (to a degree...) that we face in the 21st Century - stateless foes and the anarchic weak states in which such foes thrive. HOWEVER, when one walks down that road - and uses our disengagement from Afghanistan following the Soviet retreat - he can't also speak of Iraq as the "wrong battlefield" or a pressing need to withdraw and let them fight it out. Certainly the case can be made that going into Iraq was the wrong solution to the threat we faced. Now that we have developed a better understanding of that threat, it should be obvious to those who watch the barely constrained anarchy of Iraq that an early military departure will only seed more chaos...and further create the conditions that allowed AQ to grow within Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan.

If we depart Iraq too hastily and the Shia majority sees greater collaboration with Iran as the best means for securing their control of the political system; if the Sunni minority finds itself pushed further into the corner by Kurds and Shia, AQI will resurge. And having two or three Brigades of Americans locked in FOBs that are scattered around the country will not offer us the flexibility to act against them. Instead, it will increase their justifications for remaining a force while creating a no-win condition for those forced to hide behind blast walls while the war swirls around them.

That is the lesson from Afghanistan, just as Obama lays it out in his speech:

Above all, I will send a clear message: we will not repeat the mistake of the past, when we turned our back on Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal. As 9/11 showed us, the security of Afghanistan and America is shared. And today, that security is most threatened by the al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary in the tribal regions of northwest Pakistan.

Unfortunately, he badly misreads what an early departure from Iraq will look like:

Ending the war will help isolate al Qaeda and give Iraqis the incentive and opportunity to take them out. It will also allow us to direct badly needed resources to Afghanistan. Our troops have fought valiantly there, but Iraq has deprived them of the support they need—and deserve.

Our departure has nothing to do with "ending the war" in Iraq. Something made clear throughout the rest of the speech. If they are in the grips of a civil war, departure will not change that. It will accelerate it. That accelerated cycle of violence will create conditions for extremism to thrive - on all sides of the equation. For the Sunnis, it will mean falling back on groups such as AQI as defenders. For Shiites, it will mean further emboldening of militia groups or complete co-opting of the tools of government in order to exterminate the Sunnis. For the Kurds, it will mean an aggressive push for territory that brings it into further conflict with all of its neighbors. So...when Obama says:

"The first step must be getting off the wrong battlefield in Iraq, and taking the fight to the terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan."

...he's a day late and a dollar short. What used to be the wrong battlefield has become practically the only one that matters. Afghanistan is NOT the heart of the stateless threat we face. One could argue that Pakistan is far closer to that heart than Afghanistan...and I'd agree. But, much as we don't want to turn and face it, we have created a new threat that is far worse than that we faced in the mountains of Afghanistan. We have created the seeds for a chaos that could grip the Middle East. If we choose to let those seeds grow, our children and grandchildren will be using Iraq as the example of foolish abandonment rather than Afghanistan when they are putting together their stump speeches full of easy answers and high minded policy suggestions.

Giving Sadr the credit he's due

So Muqtada al-Sadr is back a bit more prominently in the news over the last few days. Once again, he is urging Shiites (in general) and his followers (specifically) to "resist" the American occupation. And, once again, I see a hint of rejoicing amongst those who stubbornly refuse to understand that Sadr and his militia learned their lessons from the hard fighting of 2004. Yes...from a military perspective, Sadr's militia took a drubbing in 2004 - both in Najaf and in Sadr City. No...they have not chosen to fight in that manner since - despite all of his proclamations, political maneuvering, and paramilitary activity. Instead, the militia has secured the populace from which it draws support, aggressively moved against the population from which it feels most threatened (Sunnis), waged a shadowy campaign against US and British forces relying on effective roadside bombs, and undermined US efforts to build popular support with the Iraqi Shia community - while still benefiting from the heavy Shia hand in government.

So...the same day we see some folks reveling in the "fact" that Sadr wants to "get it on," we also see what "getting it on" means in a war that is much more communication and political maneuvering as it is fighting:

Large crowds of men, women and children, holding flags and anti-US banners, gathered in Najaf and the nearby twin city of Kufa for the protest which is also seen as a show of strength for the cleric who himself has been in self-exile for more than two months, an AFP correspondent said.

[...]

Members of Sadr's movement were seen guiding the crowds, while Iraqi police and army soldiers guarded key checkpoints in and around Najaf and Kufa.

[...]

The cleric, who launched two bloody rebellions against US forces in 2004, is known for his anti-US stance and has emerged as a powerful force in the present Shiite-led Iraqi government.

His political bloc has 32 lawmakers in the 275-member Iraqi parliament and six cabinet ministers in Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's embattled government.

What does he give us to swing at? Where is a target for us to engage? Who has better learned the lessons of this war?

One part sickening, one part trend-setting

Wired News: UAV Fooled to Hide Iraq Murder

Marines acting as a death squad: sickening.

Deliberate deception operations conducted at the lowest tactical level to fool UAVs and other aerial platforms: a peek into the future of warfare - and proof that additional technology and unmanned platforms will always have difficulty replacing boots on the ground.

A strong counter-rally surprises the Post

Veterans, Others Denounce Marchers - washingtonpost.com

The large turnout surprised even some counter-demonstrators. Polls show public opinion turning against the war in Iraq, and the November election was widely seen as a repudiation of the administration's policy.

"I've never been to a war rally. I hoped I'd never have to," said Jim Wilson, 62, a Vietnam vet from New Hampshire. "We're like what they used to call the silent majority."

If Mr. Wilson (quoted above) is correct in his assumption, this is likely an issue that goes beyond the anti-war/pro-war marchers in Washington. It speaks to the organizing power of the Information Age and how deeply it has penetrated into American society.

But the war protesters have gone too far, Lee and others said. At a Jan. 27 antiwar rally, some protesters spray-painted the pavement on a Capitol terrace. Others crowned the Lone Sailor statue at the Navy Memorial on Pennsylvania Avenue with a pink tiara that had "Women for Peace" written across it.

Word of those incidents ricocheted around the Internet.

"That was the real catalyst, right there," said Navy veteran Larry Bailey. "They showed they were willing to desecrate something that's sacred to the American soul."

And, of course, any time I see people respond to the foolishness that is ANSWER, it makes me feel warm inside...

Sadr's boys reading the tea leaves?

Sadr Urges Followers to Resist U.S. Forces; Thousands Rally - washingtonpost.com:

Interesting words from a subordinate commander within the Mahdi Militia:

"'People are becoming thirsty for peace, for security, right now,' Hussein said. 'We all depend on the government and the security forces.'"

U.S. success or failure will likely hinge on the truth of his words - and the ability of US and ISF to be seen as the providers of that security.

Time will tell

Early progress in Baghdad crackdown - Conflict in Iraq - MSNBC.com

The key to success may rest in the deployment and activities of increased trooops - more so than the increase itself. If so, then it might be possible to continue improving conditions within Baghdad. If that can be maintained for a long enough period of time, eventually Iraqi leaders might find it more beneficial to advance their causes through the political system rather than through the barrel of a gun or the fanaticism of a suicide bomber.

We shall see.

Taking a walk with Sisyphus.

US commander strolls streets of contested city, eating ice cream and talking progress - International Herald Tribune

The article I highlighted yesterday dealt very specifically with conditions in Hit...as does this one. Once again, we see an effort to reestablish some sort of rule of law within the city. As is the unfortunate norm, it's almost as if 1-36 didn't spend a year there trying to do the same. Much as had been the case when 1-36 replaced a Marine MEU that had "succeeded" in its counterinsurgency campaign.

Combined, these reports easily lead one to view the COIN campaign in Iraq as a Sisyphean challenge. For a more optimistic spin on things, check out this Wikipedia entry highlighting US military efforts in Hit...and then sink back to the realization that all of the good work done there previously is now being done again - as if for the first time - by the next unit in the hopper - 2/7 IN from 3rd ID.

My personal belief, putting aside strategic and grand strategic issues, is that the method(s) of unit rotation employed by the US Military in Iraq prevent long term success. As each unit rotates in, Sisyphus' boulder rolls back down the hill while they figure out how to push it back up without getting killed in the process. Then, as they start to get some momentum, bam. Time to rotate. Time for the next unit to start from scratch. Hrmph.

An article from last September...

In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths - washingtonpost.com

...that highlights the difficulties American troops will likely encounter as they try to shift tactics more toward the touchy-feely rapport/reconnaissance work of Special Forces - but find themselves hampered by a training mindset and temperament that prefers direct conflict as a means to achieve objectives. The difficulty: military objectives can only lay the groundwork for political conditions. If those military operations create conditions that hamper political progress, they become meaningless at best and counter-productive at worst.

American units practice what the manual preaches

Soldiers Shift to Baghdad Outposts - washingtonpost.com

The outposts reflect one of the first efforts in Baghdad to actually practice what our COIN manuals (even the older manual that has recently been replaced) have always preached...life in a counterinsurgency campaign is intelligence gathering, beat walking, and relationship building...all intended to provide enough clarity so offensive operations strike at the right targets, at the right time, without the operational and strategic repercussions that often accompany poorly judged tactical targeting.

Good stuff...as long as all of the participants get it. At a higher level, I think that understanding is developing:

"We're going to get more information, and when we get that information, we can target better, and if we target better, we can get more bad guys off the street and we don't hurt the locals while we do it," he said. "And the other part of getting out here, and I think it's something we've missed in the mission for a while . . . is our purpose to protect the people."

Down at the troop level (where, ultimately, it must be understood)? Jury's still out on that one:

"These little combat outposts, they are more exposed: Your routes in here are very limited, and they're definitely watching us," Staff Sgt. Marcel Weaver, 35, said of the insurgents operating in the neighborhood around the base. A grenade "attack is coming, I can guarantee that."

How do you balance the tactical necessity of force protection with the long-term operational/strategic necessity for securing the population and building intelligence through constant presence? Especially with an army that doesn't want to be trained to do that? While American public opinion and political will wavers?

From the WaPost

Sunni Insurgents Ascendant in Iraq's Caldron of Violence - washingtonpost.com

Interesting split in strategies between the two main insurgent protagonists. The Shia lay low (likely in hopes of waiting out the surge...a lesson learned from the bloody 2004 battles with the Coalition?) while Sunni insurgent groups shoot to paint the surge as a failure - perhaps in the hope of driving the US out of Iraq before ISF (or Shia militias...or a merger of the two) are capable of dealing with them, creating the conditions for a failed state in which they are likely to retain more freedom of maneuver (as opposed to having the combined weight of the Iraqi state's security organs plus the Shia militias turned upon them). It'll be interesting to see who's gamble pays off here. I'd like to bet on the Shia simply because putting their heads down makes them more likely to get tied up into the political process if the surge manages to set the stage for it.

The term "Cognitive Dissonance" comes to mind

The new MNF-I Commander's aggressive counter-insurgency strategy - focused on getting troops out into the populace in order to reduce insurgents' freedom of maneuver, increase the sense of security within neighborhoods, and stiffen the backbone(s) of Iraqi Security Forces - makes a lot of sense. If, that is, at the tactical level, soldiers understand how to carry out his mandate. Reports like these leave one wondering.

Cognitive Dissonance:

a psychological term which describes the uncomfortable tension that comes from holding two conflicting thoughts at the same time. More precisely, it is the perception of incompatibility between two cognitions, where "cognition" is defined as any element of knowledge, including attitude, emotion, belief, or behavior.

Ethics and Morality on a Sliding Scale

Are ethics constant? Or are our ethics determined by our survival instinct, our belief in a cause, or simple ruthless pragmatism? In the spring and summer of 2004, I spent three months in Iraq working for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – the American-led interim government of Iraq that existed until late 2004 when it was replaced by Iraqis. During my time in country, I really only encountered two situations that threatened to slide my own ethics scale.

In the first, our 3-vehicle convoy was ambushed on the highway between Ramadi and Fallujah. The suddenness of the attack, the speed we were traveling, and the amount of incoming fire we received in the trail vehicle precluded an immediate counterattack. By the time our three disabled vehicles had come to a stop, all we saw were two vehicles behind us. One had stopped and the other did a rapid u-turn before vanishing in the opposite direction (“A Bad Day”).

The four of us who had aimed our weapons tracked the u-turning vehicle through our sights but didn't shoot because we simply didn't see a clear threat. As the badly shaken - but unhurt - local driver of the second, stopped, vehicle began to get out, we fired two warning shots to keep him from approaching.

As we moved to a more defensible position, removed from our three disabled vehicles, we began to share our knowledge of the ambush while planning our next course of action. It quickly became apparent, as we put the story together, that the car behind us had been a part of the ambush. Later analysis of some of the bullet holes in my vehicle would confirm our thoughts. Our ethical standards, the degree of ingrained "threat identification" training we had all received at one time or another, and our understanding of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) we operated under had prevented us from engaging. We had made our first morally correct - but tactically questionable - decision of the day.

As the sun began to set and we surveyed our surroundings, still unsure when the military would be able to reach us, other questions came to mind. We debated taking Iraqi cars at gunpoint so we could continue our journey, debated moving the 500-1000 meters to the nearest residence and occupying that - regardless of whether or not it was already occupied by an Iraqi family, faced the internal shoot/no-shoot debate twice when Iraqi men on motorcycles passed close by our position.

In weighing all of these issues, we chose to take the most morally correct position. We did not "steal" a car, kick a family out of their home, or shoot the motorcyclists. We waited for the military to show up and hitched a ride back to Ramadi for the night. But what if the situation had been different? What if one of us had been seriously wounded? What if the ambushers had not cleared out of the area or we had not been able to find an easily defensible spot near our vehicles? How easily would ethics have been overwhelmed by survival instinct? In other words, how far would that scale have slid if our conditions had been more dire? Being practical thinkers, it's not something that entered our minds at the time. We simply followed the most logical course of action. In this case, that course of action was also the "most moral."

Fast forward three or so weeks. We were driving through Baghdad on our way from the Green Zone back to Baqubah, a troubled, ethnically divided city north of Baghdad. Six or seven of us in two unarmored late model SUVs. There were only so many good routes to travel in Baghdad...and we didn't spend enough time down there to have a good feel for which routes were the best - or how to transition between them if one turned bad.

Our journey through the center of the city happened to coincide with a massive pro-Sadr rally. The Blackwater contractors had been killed less than a week before in Fallujah. Sadr's newspaper had just been shut down. The following day, his militia would begin aggressively engaging American military patrols. And there we were, stuck in the middle of the rally, surrounded by tens of thousands of his followers ("Well hello").

As the press of bodies tightened around our vehicles, as individual Sadrists stepped forward to express their discontent with American policies in a most reasonable manner, and as we eyed possible ways out if things went bad, I do not believe that moral and ethical considerations weighed heavily on my mind. Instead, I was weighing how many people we'd
have to run over to get to open pavement - and whether the vehicles could handle it. I was judging who I would shoot first if the crowd attacked, and I was determining how difficult it would be to reach the nearest building if we were forced to create a makeshift defensive position. As the threat became more real, our decisions became weighted more by immediate tactical than moral issues. Yes, we did everything we could to prevent a violent incident. Yes,
we kept our guns out of sight when possible. Yes, we determined that drastic action would be taken be as a last resort rather than in a preemptive manner. But those decisions were based more on survival instinct and common sense than anything else. Or perhaps I'm mistaken. Maybe our decision to wait for events to unfold rather than force a violent conclusion indicates that an underlying sense of right and wrong helped guide those decisions. I don't know. But I do know that I felt a great deal of empathy for the Marine in Fallujah video-taped "executing" an Iraqi (West and Carter).

While I don't feel "empathy" per se, I also understand many of the tactics employed ("The Insurgency") by the insurgents in Iraq - at least in their methods for countering U.S. tactical advantages...certainly not for the wholesale killing of their own people in the name of fomenting terror.

The rigid code of conduct most organized - or at least most Western - militaries tend to operate under was designed around the notion of fighting another similarly trained and equipped force - a force that utilizes similar tactics - and operates by similar laws of war ("Laws of War"). For insurgents with less tactical skill, considerably fewer resources, and no formal system of authority to prevent or punish excesses, fighting under the rules of war observed by the United States would be fatal. Insurgents counter these disadvantages by exploiting the ROE, ethical code, and Americans' acceptance of the laws of war. Just as Americans attempt to counter Iraqi advantages of familiarity with terrain and the ability to move among and blend with the populace by fighting at night, striking from a 'safe' distance, or striking from an unexpected position.

Ethics and morality can be a slippery subject - especially when high-minded ideals meet the ugliness of the real world. When do we pass from prudent survival measures to defeat implacable foes to the “slippery slope” of justifying our means by exaggerating the ends - or the level of crisis?

Robert McNamara addresses this issue in some detail in "The Fog of War." For many die-hard Vietnam protesters, his admission that some of the actions he recommended during World War II could be 'defined' as war crimes comes as a point of victory...but that's the point at which many stop listening. In his elaboration, he discusses the issue of the sliding scale of ethics. If we really were fighting an implacable enemy, if driving him to utter destruction was the only way to secure victory and protect our own nation's absolutely vital interests, then those "crimes" become acceptable in the name of that goal. The survival instinct comes into play at the strategic level.

And now we reach the crux of the matter. Who defines the level of threat our nation is faced with? When one man, full of adrenaline, is faced with a life or death situation, there is little doubt in his mind that he is fighting for his existence. Perhaps those removed from the scene and unable to gauge that threat might think differently (as in the case with the Marine), but that is irrelevant to someone making split-second decisions intended to save his own life.

James Doolittle in 1954:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed object is world domination by whatever means and whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct no longer apply.... We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us.

James Woolsey in 2002:

But, I would say this. Both to the terrorists and to the pathological predators such as Saddam Hussein and to the autocrats as well, the barbarics, the Saudi royal family. They have to realize that now for the fourth time in 100 years, we’ve been awakened and this country is on the march. We didn’t choose this fight, but we’re in it. And being on the march, there’s only one way we’re going to be able to win it. It’s the way we won World War I fighting for Wilson’s 14 points. The way we won World War II fighting for Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter and the way we won World War III fighting for the noble ideas I think best expressed by President Reagan, but also very importantly at the beginning by President Truman, that this was not a war of us against them. It was not a war of countries. It was a war of freedom against tyranny.

This is the debate that we find ourselves in today - much as we found ourselves reevaluating the Cold War as it progressed. What is the level of threat we face? What is the appropriate response? How much must we sacrifice the spectator's ideals of morality and ethics to ensure our survival in the arena of the real world? How should our individual soldiers respond to an enemy that has no legal, ethical, or moral limits? How should our nation respond? And how do we codify this? Judging from past responses, the United States has tended to move aggressively to counter threats, often shoving aside basic freedoms routinely guaranteed to Americans. Then time, protest, investigation (Stout), and debate (“Foreign Intelligence”) have reestablished those freedoms ("Sedition Act"). Slowly, we see the most extreme measures of post-9/11 policies being exposed and rolled back - or at least vigorously debated. And so we enter the most difficult stage of this debate: reaching common ground on how serious a threat we are faced with and then debating how far we slide our ethics scale to combat it. As a nation, we must remember two points: human survival instinct will, at times, bypass morality as the strongest influence on our actions; more importantly however, that same survival instinct can and must be shaped by our ethical underpinnings - at both the individual and collective levels

Disillusionment, war, Strategic Corporals, all that stuff

'Waiting to Get Blown Up'

How do you make an Army realize the 'war' it wants...isn't:

"No one wants to be here, you know, no one is truly enthused about what we do," said Sgt. Christopher Dugger, the squad leader. "We were excited, but then it just wears on you -- there's only so much you can take. Like me, personally, I want to fight in a war like World War II. I want to fight an enemy. And this, out here," he said, motioning around the scorched sand-and-gravel base, the rows of Humvees and barracks, toward the trash-strewn streets of Baghdad outside, "there is no enemy, it's a faceless enemy. He's out there, but he's hiding."

How do you suppose a grunt from WWII, fresh off the lines in Normandy, Italy, or any of the Pacific islands would answer that 'desire' to re-fight WWII?

And how do you make an army train to fight the war it finds itself in rather than the war it envisions?

"We're trained as an Army to fight and destroy the enemy and then take over," added Dugger, 26, of Reno, Nev. "But I don't think we're trained enough to push along a country, and that's what we're actually doing out here."

I think the passage of time has created a false image of WWII...of morale, effectiveness, and the 'joy' of waging full-scale conflict every day. That being said, soldiers who have resigned themselves to getting "blown up" everyday while they search for an enemy to fight probably have not fully internalized the tenets of a counterinsurgency campaign.

Such a campaign is advanced by inches - and those inches are measured within the minds of the locals, not by terrain or enemies killed. In some cases, the metrics make all the differences...which explains the optimism displayed in a number of blogs written by soldiers serving in units that perhaps better understood what success looks like in a counter-insurgency campaign.

Let's talk about political grandstanding....

This is rich:

A group of about 20 House of Representatives Democrats sent a letter to House Speaker Dennis Hastert urging the Illinois Republican to secure an apology from Maliki or cancel the address on Wednesday to a joint meeting of Congress. Some said they planned to boycott the speech.

Uh-huh. Who said we were gonna allow the elected leader of a country to express his opinions or the opinions of his (largely Shia...you know, like Hezbollah) majority constituency when he talks to Congress? That would be a slap in the face to those who sacrificed so much to get him there in the first place, right? But, of course, abandoning Iraq in the midst of the violence (an oft-suggested policy change suggested by said Democrats) is not a slap in the face to those who sacrificed, right?

So...Maliki appeals to his base in a speech. The Dems decry his appeal to his base in an appeal to their own (just not the "Get out of Iraq" portion of the base). And what do the Republicans do? I'm sure THEY'D never stoop to such lows, right? Right?

Ah...the joy of politics.

Back to the nature of war - once again.

More talk of what the rash of charges against US troops means. Breakdown of discipline? I don't think so. Military attempts to dodge the Press by pushing a bunch of old cases into the light of day at once? Again, I don't believe so.

My guess? The initial investigations of Haditha (and a few others) caused various levels of command to kick into high gear and begin investigating their own actions (or, more appropriately, the actions of their subordinate units). These more thorough investigations and increased command emphasis kicked up a number of cases that had been poorly hidden - or no one had been looking since commanders all like to assume problems like this can't occur on their watch - so we're seeing them all appear 'at about the same time.' The bottom line is that you don't find what you aren't looking for.

At the same time, the US military is doing a much better job of understanding the non-kinetic side of this fight. Because of this, they are re-investigating incidents that a year or two ago might not have caught a second glance. That's a good thing. What it really indicates is the military doing a much better job of internal policing as opposed to a rash of crimes from 'burnt out soldiers.' Counter-insurgency is tough work...and it's a whole lot tougher if commanders don't understand just how different it is from a straight-up black and white fight. Once again, we're seeing the effect of the Strategic Corporal. And by that, I don't mean a junior enlisted soldier specially trained to make strategic decisions...I mean that those tactical, minute-by-minute decisions made by junior soldiers now have strategic or even grand-strategic implications...whether it's choosing to leave one Hummer to man a checkpoint, choosing to leave a weak leader in charge of a checkpoint, or shooting the wrong car approaching a checkpoint. Unfortunately, we outside of the war zone are most exposed to the actions of the Strategic Corporal when the decision is incorrect. The correct decisions allow s/he to better understand the enemy, better understand the nature of the threat, and better understand what appropriate action looks like. Those decisions lead to a more successful unit over the course of weeks, months, and years. Difficult to track in our ADD society and often hard to quantify. Mistakes are easy to quantify. There are dead soldiers, captured soldiers, or dead civilians. More IEDs because there are more angry Iraqis. All the sort of stuff that is easy for the Press to cover. How exactly can a reporter even report the individual successes of these Strategic Corporals? In most cases, they can't recognize success or even wise decisions because they don't have the background, can't wait out the consequences of the actions, or simply aren't looking because it doesn't fit their chosen meme.

That being said, I've seen a lot of good reports documenting units taking the right steps - of those 'corporals' making the more difficult 'right' strategic decision that often may appear to increase the risk to his/her patrol in the short term.

Imagine for a moment,

Imagine for a moment that you are a member of the Iraqi security forces. Perhaps you have joined because it was the only job available, perhaps because you formerly served under Saddam's regime, perhaps because you suffered at the old regime's hands and wish to prevent those abuses from happening again. To a certain degree, the reasons largely become irrelevant.

Imagine that your family has been terrorized, you have been threatened, and your friends and comrades have been killed. On the news, you hear repeatedly that the United States does not truly support a free Iraq. You hear that the insurgency is growing, that security forces grow more fearful rather than more assertive. It sinks in. You begin to question your role - and the future of your country.

Now imagine that you are assigned to provide security during the elections. Imagine that you are awakened to the silent majority's resolve as they file endlessly by to the polls, dismissing fears of attack. Imagine watching men and women of all ages, all beliefs, all ethnicities expressing their free will in the face of fear. Imagine that the initial flush of joy you felt when the old regime collapsed has returned...only now it is stiffened with a pride in your country and your countrymen.

Imagine how this will affect your actions when you next encounter those who choose violence over the rule of the law. Imagine, for a moment, physical courage bound with a burgeoning sense of duty, commitment, and pride.

Imagine that, Kos. Imagine that, "Professor" Cole. Imagine that, Mr. Moore. Just for a moment.

Update:

Exhibit A:

Despite 260 insurgent attacks - the highest level yet seen in one day - the "degree of lethality" was remarkably low, reflecting high readiness and morale among the Iraqi police and military units guarding the sites, the US diplomat said.

"In almost every case, Iraqi forces stopped the attacks."

Exhibit B:

Shuwayli threw his arms around the bomber and drove him backward about 50 feet into an intersection. The rush seemed to catch the suicide attacker by surprise. The bomber had a hand grenade but failed to throw it. A second or two passed before he detonated an explosive belt, police Lt. Col. Kadham Abbas said.

Update 2:

Steven Vincent from the Red Zone discusses winners, losers, and work yet to be done. As he says,

In the past, the homegrown Iraqi militants got a lot of mileage from their claims that they fought a "foreign occupation." Whatever little merit that argument possessed has vanished with the election: now the ex-Baathist Saddamites appear in their true light--fascists attempting to overturn a democratic government. At what temperature does the legitimacy of reactionaries burn? Fahrenheit 9-11.

Update 3:

Eric Martin at Total Information Awareness offers a realistic assessment of the (numerous) issues still to be addressed now that the elections are behind us. He also includes a number of great links to other takes on the election and their meaning (or lack thereof, for the more cynically minded).

Iraq
Elections