An argument we will see much more if in the next 12-18 months....
The only hypothesis that can begin to explain the continued military presence in Afghanistan is the theory that defense of the homeland begins at the Hindu Kush; we fight them there so we don’t have to fight them here. The immediate corollary being to prevent another ‘strategic shock’ like the events of 9/11, we must secure and stabilize the ungoverned, radical breeding ground from which they were hatched and could once again return to set up shop anew. There are multiple flaws in this argument which, taken at face value, yields a slippery slope of never-ending military engagements for anyplace we find an ‘ungoverned space’ or anywhere we find extremist elements which violently disagree with US policy or presence. Furthermore, this “strategy” to use the term loosely, will forever keep us on the strategic defensive, letting the ‘enemy’ call the shots while not enabling us to see beyond the tactical, threat-focused lens of the Cold War’s dead-and-buried paradigm.
...and I'm currently see-sawing back and forth on it myself. Successful execution of the U.S. COIN doctrine is extremely resource-and-time intensive. I'm not sure if such a large commitment to Afghanistan is wisest use of resources at this point.
The best argument against this view is covered in the first comment after the article: we have put our strategic credibility on the line in Afghanistan and must demonstrate some degree of success to maintain it.
