The non-story that wouldn't die.

It seems that many blogs and mainstream media folks are refusing to let go of the non-story regarding Rumsfeld and his supposed disregard for soldiers because he has not magically armored every vehicle in the United States military. I stick by my original stance that this is a false argument generated by those who simply don't like Rumsfeld and the Bush administration but want to show that they hate the 'Man' but are hip to the soldier.

Is that a simplified argument on my part? You bet. Almost as simple as the belief that the Secretary of Defense can armor vehicles with the wave of a hand.

Here's what The Independent had to say on the 11th:

The row over America's failure to send enough military vehicles to Iraq took a new twist yesterday when the company that manufactures them said it could deliver 1,200 more a year, but has had no request from the Pentagon.

I added the emphasis there. Why? Because the lack of armored vehicles is the story of the day but the real story that reporters like to allude to (and probably a more valid story, in my mind) is Rumsfeld and company's decision to invade Iraq with a smaller force. THAT is something for which the Defense Secretary can legitimately receive blame. This comes from later in the story:

But critics say the problem runs deeper, the latest manifestation of a mindset that began before the war when the Pentagon's civilian leadership refused to heed military commanders who said "several hundred thousand" troops would be needed. The present US force is 138,000, soon to be 150,000.

The Seattle-Post Intelligencer lists this in their opinion section:

The fig leaves are tumbling from the cover story Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gave to a soldier's query on Wednesday about the lack of armored vehicles available in Iraq.

"It isn't a matter of money. It isn't a matter on the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of production and capability of doing it," Rumsfeld answered when pressed on the armor question in Kuwait.

But that appears to be simply not true. Cox News Service reported Friday that both the company that makes Humvees for the military and the company that adds armor to the utility vehicles could make plenty more, if the Pentagon would ask them.

There is still a critical shortage of armored-up Humvees and only a tiny percentage of the nearly 9,000 military transport trucks used to supply troops in Iraq are armored. Even the Humvees with added armor remain unprotected on the top and bottom, and the added weight of the armor reportedly has increased the stress on, and failure rate of, the vehicles' transmissions.

So we armor every vehicle to the point they are slow, tactically and strategically immobile, unbalanced, and prone to breakdown? How long do people really think this takes? How long will it take to design and produce medium and large trucks armored to a level acceptable to the press or to the soldiers who crew them? How long to replace every Humvee in the military? No one WANTS to be in a vehicle that can be damaged or destroyed…by ANYthing. It's easy to go to contractors and hear them say "Sure! We can do that for ya!" Not so easy to get the products contracted, tested, and delivered. Suddenly the new source of honest information would be defense contractors? Gimme a break!

From WatchBlog's liberal side we have this:

They have continually missed the point of why these things are brought up. The purpose here is not just to embarass the Bush Adminstration, but to shame them into doing what they should have done in the first place. Whether that's basing a war on good intelligence, getting our logistics straight and planning to deal with worst cases, it doesn't matter- the questions are meant to provoke action, and to force solutions on a government that been dragging it's feet, trying to save political face.

To shame them into armoring every vehicle in the U.S. military inventory? Who was going to pay for that prior to the war? What military has EVER thought that to be a necessity? The problem of logistics in the U.S. military runs far deeper than this administration…and has existed for far longer. There's nothing wrong with reporters bringing this issue up - and there's nothing wrong with soldiers asking the question because sometimes that's how we bypass the bureaucratic tangles of large organizations.

That soldier's question and the DoD's response will likely lead to more funding and more attention for armored vehicles. That's a good thing. Is that an unintended consequence of Rumsfeld's visit with the troops? Or are meetings like that meant to give the secretary an idea of what the common soldier is thinking and feeling? For members of the media, everything becomes theater. Rumsfeld can't appear in front of the troops just to find out what's going on. There has to be more to it. It has to be a show. Thus, when something useful comes out of the event, it becomes a huge news event. People hold it up as proof that the media saved the day and stopped a conspiracy. No one pays attention to the fact that Rumsfeld went in front of those soldiers and asked, "What are your concerns?"

Going to war is a calculated risk. Rumsfeld, in his continuing efforts to move the Pentagon from its Cold War force structure and mentality, accepted an additional calculated risk by accepting the war plans of officers who thought technology and training could overcome the traditional 3-1 force ratio required to attack. He chose to disregard some people he should have listened to…and chose to listen to some he should have disregarded. He's certainly not the FIRST to make that mistake.

Is the new standard for American military vehicles now going to be armored to the point they can stop small arms? RPGs? Tank rounds? Where do we draw the line?

The military is in the middle of trying to figure out how to get 'leaner and meaner,' more able to rapidly response to crises. Into this effort crash the amateurs, crying out that mobility (strategic or otherwise) is foolish. Because everyone should be everything-proof. How will these same arm-chair strategists respond when our military is unable to respond to the next crisis because its vehicles are too heavy to be moved anywhere? Will the great hue and cry then be that we're letting 'our boys' die because we can't move fast enough? Because we spent too much time and money needlessly armoring vehicles? How quickly will people forget the weeping and gnashing of teeth over this issue when the next crisis arrives – brought on by the solutions they recommended to solve the current crisis?

Let's step back and examine the issues more closely here. The United States is experiencing an ugly insurgency in Iraq that has highlighted the vulnerabilities of its supply lines. In reaction to this vulnerability, what is the correct response?

A) Developing a force that is designed solely for traveling on the roads of Iraq by relying on top-down solutions that take years to implement – and years to change again.

B) Soldiers and leaders at the lower levels recognizing the specific threats they are facing and addressing them with a quick, temporary solution that does not have negative consequences five, ten, or fifteen years from now (that would be 'hillbilly armor,' y'all).

Let's not let short-term (but certainly legitimate) problems cause us to lose sight of long term issues.