I just finished van Creveld's Rise and Decline of the State

I finally found the time to sit down and work my way through Martin van Creveld's Rise and Decline. While I'm certainly glad that I did, I find myself uncomfortable with some of his assumptions. First, a brief synopsis of his work:

The state, which since the middle of the seventeenth century has been the most important and most characteristic of all modern institutions, is in decline. From Western Europe to Africa, many existing states are either combining into larger communities or falling apart. Many of their functions are being taken over by a variety of organizations which, whatever their precise nature, are not states. In this unique volume Martin van Creveld traces the story of the state from its beginnings to the present. Starting with the simplest political organizations that ever existed, he guides the reader through the origins of the state, its development, its apotheosis during the two World Wars, and its spread from its original home in Western Europe to cover the globe. In doing so, he provides a fascinating history of government from its origins to the present day.

Yes...he certainly does all that...but I get the feeling the book (written in 1999) shows its age. How? One of the bedrocks of State power has been nationalism. During the early years of THIS round of globalization (essentially after the Berlin Wall fell), nationalism began to fade across many of what we consider to be the advanced states. That downswing in nationalism is one of the trends van Creveld noted in his book...but I don't think he expected the upswing that was, I believe, sparked by the market meltdowns in Asia, Latin America, and Russia; the international backlash to the spread of "Americanism" (as many have come to term 'globalization' - and often tied into many peoples' impressions of the root cause of those meltdowns); the 9/11 attacks; or the strong surge in nationalism that has accompanied the rise of east Asian powers (China and Korea most specifically - but extending to Malaysia and perhaps Indonesia as well).

Viewed from 2005, I would say the book does a better job of documenting the decline of the Western state - although as members states of the EU begin to bicker amongst themselves, consider limits to immigration, and question unfettered globalization, that assumption could be called into question as well. Of course van Creveld may simply view the latest actions of the EU nations as "too little, too late."

One of the underlying assumptions van Creveld makes (although he doesn't go into specific details) is that another type of entity will replace the State as the most efficient means of organizing people and resources. Since he is not in possession of a crystal ball, he doesn't spend much time elaborating on just what that might be. Others, of course have done that for him. After reading Rise and Decline and wandering around the net a bit to get a feel for how others view van Creveld and his work, I noticed his work has been heralded by some libertarian organizations (such as LewRockman.com) - and that he published a rather scathing review of US efforts in Iraq, tying them quite tightly (too tightly, in my eyes) to Vietnam. One of his key arguments against the war is built upon an argument he uses in questioning Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank as well:

In private life, an adult who keeps beating down on a five year old – even such a one as originally attacked him with a knife – will be perceived as committing a crime; therefore he will lose the support of bystanders and end up by being arrested, tried and convicted. In international life, an armed force that keeps beating down on a weaker opponent will be seen as committing a series of crimes; therefore it will end up by losing the support of its allies, its own people, and its own troops. Depending on the quality of the forces – whether they are draftees or professionals, the effectiveness of the propaganda machine, the nature of the political process, and so on – things may happen quickly or take a long time to mature. However, the outcome is always the same. He (or she) who does not understand this does not understand anything about war; or, indeed, human nature.

In other words, he who fights against the weak – and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak indeed – and loses, loses. He who fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore foolish. As Vietnam and countless other cases prove, no armed force however rich, however powerful, however, advanced, and however well motivated is immune to this dilemma.

Luckily(?) for the Americans, the insurgents in Iraq (much like the hard core of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in the occupied territories), have chosen to skip this lesson. In aggressively targeting innocent civilians, they have managed to put themselves in a position where they appear as villains to much of the world even as they carry out insurgencies that would otherwise receive a great deal more public support (witness the success of the first Palestinian Intifada).

If the Iraqi insurgency had built on the sympathy generated after the second seige of Fallujah - and shifted attacks largely to American targets while presenting an alternative to the current interim government that did NOT involve Islamism, they would be far ahead of where they are now...where they are generally reduced to trying to sow as much general chaos as possible because they can accomplish little that is viewed as constructive.

I wonder how much of this shift has been generated by the loss(es) of former Baathist leaders, organizers, and financiers among the insurgency. As Sunni Islamists (often foreign-born) take a greater role in directing the insurgency (as much as one can actually 'direct' such an amorphous creature as the Iraqi insurgency), it turns more into a campaign of vindictiveness and hatred - frowned upon by much of the rest of the Islamic world. They so tarnish their image as the "weak" fighting the "strong" that van Creveld's assumptions (much more correct in November 2004 when he wrote the article) appear off-base. Viewed from the weak vs. strong angle, Israel's pull-out from Gaza appears a wise move - a step toward putting Israel back in the position of victim rather than ruthless oppressor.

Yikes. I just realized I've wandered a bit off-topic in discussing Rise and Decline of the State. I'd call it an interesting book that outlines a possible future but far less certain than van Creveld believes (or at least believed at the time he wrote his book - a time when globalization seemed so difficult to slow or resist and nationalism seemed foolish at best). I did notice one of the Amazon reviewers commenting on some historical inaccuracies within the book...and openly wondering if perhaps there were more.

UPDATE: Cicero from (the appropriately named) Between Hope and Fear puts a positive spin on what society after the State could look like, arguing that social networks spun together over the Internet go a long way toward tearing down traditional national borders (something I've seen for myself in traveling to different parts of the world. The cultural similarities I've witnessed among youths from Asia to the Middle East are striking).

Between he and Peggy Noonan (she taking the far more pessimistic view), they do a fairly thorough job of supporting Mr. van Creveld and covering my assumptions in mud. I HATE it when that happens!

Tags:

Martin Van Creveld
Rise and Decline of the State
Globalization
Iraq
Middle East Conflict