The Progress he chooses to ignore

Interesting quote from a story in the NY Times today that addresses decreasing media coverage of both Iraq and Afghanistan:

"But the tactical success of the surge should not be misconstrued as making Iraq a safer place for American soldiers. Last year was the bloodiest in the five-year history of the conflict, with more than 900 dead, and last month, 52 perished, making it the bloodiest month of the year so far. So far in May, 18 have died."

Right! Great point! Only, um, tactical success HAS made Iraq a safer place for American soldiers. From September of 07 when US forces lost 65 soldiers, casualties have dropped precipitously, averaging a little over 36 (not counting May - which appears to be on track as a month with the fewest American fatalities since the start of the war - with the possible exception of Feb 2004). All this while American soldiers have more aggressively worked outside of their protected FOBs, interacted much more deeply with Iraqi citizens as well as Iraqi security forces. Since the drop off in Sep 07, IED events have dropped significantly, violence in Anbar has largely vanished, and casualties (such as those suffered last month) are much more attributable to specific campaigns - in the case of April, a focused campaign to reduce the power of the most radical militias associated with Muqtada al Sadr.

Of course, the other issue that no one seems to want to cover too deeply is how many of the increased casualties from April came as a result of greater assistance provided by Iran. In fact, as American casualties have dropped over the past few months, Iranian efforts to generate greater instability have noticeably increased - and often become less covert.

There is a fundamental truth associated with this reduction in media interest in Iraq...the truth is that - despite a very heavy cost to the individuals - American combat forces in Iraq, built on the idea of volunteerism and steeped in the experiences of multiple tours, have developed an affinity for counter-insurgency that very few believed possible. Even in the early days when individual commanders knew what they were supposed to say about COIN, their troops, by and large, didn't get it. We had a force primarily designed for kinetic action. The talk of a LTC or COL did not affect the actions of PV2 or SPC4 fighting in the streets. That's changed now. The truly savvy counterinsurgents exist at every level. They understand the strategic impact of tactical actions. They know you can't simply kill your way out of an insurgency.

None of this, of course, makes for very good copy. Soldiers who are careful about what they say to the press aren't of as much interest. Since most media sources are always looking for stories that can focus on failure, there is substantially less interest in covering success. So reporting resources are shifted to areas that seem likely to garner better ratings and the situation in Iraq improves without the benefits of the sort of mass coverage that existed as the situation deteriorated. In many ways, that's a shame. But I'd rather see coverage continue to decline if that decline remains associated with improving conditions on the ground....