I'll be honest...

I'm not sure what Baer really has going for him other than his ability to write a book (which I, admittedly, have not read). His perspective on AQ in Iraq, as displayed in this Time article, isn't BAD, but it's largely the same as the official perspective within the American institutions that he slams for not getting it. Over the course of the last year, the US military and much of the intelligence establishment have gotten much better at understanding insurgency and counterinsurgency (has it been because they've really felt like they were up against the clock? Has it been enough people with on the ground experience finally ascending to the proper levels to influence key decisions? I dunno. Probably a mix). This increase in savvy has flummoxed the punditocracy who made their living off sounding like they knew more than the actual practitioners. 

Oops! Shoe's on the other foot now and all these guys are struggling to redefine their core message as American efforts prove surprisingly successful. In Baer's case, it's pretending that AQI wasn't a huge destabilizing force within Iraq (regardless of size) and pretending that general chaos and the disempowerment of Sunnis DIDN'T offer AQ a powerful tool for recruiting worldwide. 

AQI has been pushed to near-strategic defeat in Iraq both because its way of thinking has been proven ineffective - by OUR efforts - and because a whole lot of key terrorist leaders have been killed by an effective network attack campaign waged by American Special Operations forces.

To turn a blind eye toward AQ's former strength in Iraq - or its value as a recruiting tool is a sure sign that it is the pundits - and not the practitioners - who are far less interested in "lessons learned" from our post-9/11 experiences. You know, those experiences that have created this particular punditocracy in the first place....