How long will it last?

This article in the IHT leads me to wonder...how long will China's image of the "anti-hegemon" last within the world in general and the Third World in particular? How long until the tables begin to turn and nations tire of the caveats, requirements, and coalitions required to enjoy Chinese largesse?

Yet Chinese support does come with conditions, including a ban on formal ties with rival Taiwan and expectations that recipients vote with China at the United Nations. This month, South Africa joined Beijing in voting against a resolution to censure Myanmar for human rights abuses, arousing criticism that South Africa had forgotten the United Nation's role in abolishing apartheid.

In much of the world, anti-globalization is synonomous (currently) with anti-Americanism - since we are generally seen to be the strongest cultural force advancing within its context. But in economic terms, it is China that gains the most from globalization - and China that does so at the expense of developing countries since it's labor pool directly competes with that of many smaller countries.

In South Africa, where trade unions have complained that Chinese textile imports have been devastating domestic industry, President Thabo Mbeki pointedly told a student audience last month that Africa needed to guard against allowing relations with China to develop into a "colonial relationship."

Ethics and Morality on a Sliding Scale

Are ethics constant? Or are our ethics determined by our survival instinct, our belief in a cause, or simple ruthless pragmatism? In the spring and summer of 2004, I spent three months in Iraq working for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – the American-led interim government of Iraq that existed until late 2004 when it was replaced by Iraqis. During my time in country, I really only encountered two situations that threatened to slide my own ethics scale.

In the first, our 3-vehicle convoy was ambushed on the highway between Ramadi and Fallujah. The suddenness of the attack, the speed we were traveling, and the amount of incoming fire we received in the trail vehicle precluded an immediate counterattack. By the time our three disabled vehicles had come to a stop, all we saw were two vehicles behind us. One had stopped and the other did a rapid u-turn before vanishing in the opposite direction (“A Bad Day”).

The four of us who had aimed our weapons tracked the u-turning vehicle through our sights but didn't shoot because we simply didn't see a clear threat. As the badly shaken - but unhurt - local driver of the second, stopped, vehicle began to get out, we fired two warning shots to keep him from approaching.

As we moved to a more defensible position, removed from our three disabled vehicles, we began to share our knowledge of the ambush while planning our next course of action. It quickly became apparent, as we put the story together, that the car behind us had been a part of the ambush. Later analysis of some of the bullet holes in my vehicle would confirm our thoughts. Our ethical standards, the degree of ingrained "threat identification" training we had all received at one time or another, and our understanding of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) we operated under had prevented us from engaging. We had made our first morally correct - but tactically questionable - decision of the day.

As the sun began to set and we surveyed our surroundings, still unsure when the military would be able to reach us, other questions came to mind. We debated taking Iraqi cars at gunpoint so we could continue our journey, debated moving the 500-1000 meters to the nearest residence and occupying that - regardless of whether or not it was already occupied by an Iraqi family, faced the internal shoot/no-shoot debate twice when Iraqi men on motorcycles passed close by our position.

In weighing all of these issues, we chose to take the most morally correct position. We did not "steal" a car, kick a family out of their home, or shoot the motorcyclists. We waited for the military to show up and hitched a ride back to Ramadi for the night. But what if the situation had been different? What if one of us had been seriously wounded? What if the ambushers had not cleared out of the area or we had not been able to find an easily defensible spot near our vehicles? How easily would ethics have been overwhelmed by survival instinct? In other words, how far would that scale have slid if our conditions had been more dire? Being practical thinkers, it's not something that entered our minds at the time. We simply followed the most logical course of action. In this case, that course of action was also the "most moral."

Fast forward three or so weeks. We were driving through Baghdad on our way from the Green Zone back to Baqubah, a troubled, ethnically divided city north of Baghdad. Six or seven of us in two unarmored late model SUVs. There were only so many good routes to travel in Baghdad...and we didn't spend enough time down there to have a good feel for which routes were the best - or how to transition between them if one turned bad.

Our journey through the center of the city happened to coincide with a massive pro-Sadr rally. The Blackwater contractors had been killed less than a week before in Fallujah. Sadr's newspaper had just been shut down. The following day, his militia would begin aggressively engaging American military patrols. And there we were, stuck in the middle of the rally, surrounded by tens of thousands of his followers ("Well hello").

As the press of bodies tightened around our vehicles, as individual Sadrists stepped forward to express their discontent with American policies in a most reasonable manner, and as we eyed possible ways out if things went bad, I do not believe that moral and ethical considerations weighed heavily on my mind. Instead, I was weighing how many people we'd
have to run over to get to open pavement - and whether the vehicles could handle it. I was judging who I would shoot first if the crowd attacked, and I was determining how difficult it would be to reach the nearest building if we were forced to create a makeshift defensive position. As the threat became more real, our decisions became weighted more by immediate tactical than moral issues. Yes, we did everything we could to prevent a violent incident. Yes,
we kept our guns out of sight when possible. Yes, we determined that drastic action would be taken be as a last resort rather than in a preemptive manner. But those decisions were based more on survival instinct and common sense than anything else. Or perhaps I'm mistaken. Maybe our decision to wait for events to unfold rather than force a violent conclusion indicates that an underlying sense of right and wrong helped guide those decisions. I don't know. But I do know that I felt a great deal of empathy for the Marine in Fallujah video-taped "executing" an Iraqi (West and Carter).

While I don't feel "empathy" per se, I also understand many of the tactics employed ("The Insurgency") by the insurgents in Iraq - at least in their methods for countering U.S. tactical advantages...certainly not for the wholesale killing of their own people in the name of fomenting terror.

The rigid code of conduct most organized - or at least most Western - militaries tend to operate under was designed around the notion of fighting another similarly trained and equipped force - a force that utilizes similar tactics - and operates by similar laws of war ("Laws of War"). For insurgents with less tactical skill, considerably fewer resources, and no formal system of authority to prevent or punish excesses, fighting under the rules of war observed by the United States would be fatal. Insurgents counter these disadvantages by exploiting the ROE, ethical code, and Americans' acceptance of the laws of war. Just as Americans attempt to counter Iraqi advantages of familiarity with terrain and the ability to move among and blend with the populace by fighting at night, striking from a 'safe' distance, or striking from an unexpected position.

Ethics and morality can be a slippery subject - especially when high-minded ideals meet the ugliness of the real world. When do we pass from prudent survival measures to defeat implacable foes to the “slippery slope” of justifying our means by exaggerating the ends - or the level of crisis?

Robert McNamara addresses this issue in some detail in "The Fog of War." For many die-hard Vietnam protesters, his admission that some of the actions he recommended during World War II could be 'defined' as war crimes comes as a point of victory...but that's the point at which many stop listening. In his elaboration, he discusses the issue of the sliding scale of ethics. If we really were fighting an implacable enemy, if driving him to utter destruction was the only way to secure victory and protect our own nation's absolutely vital interests, then those "crimes" become acceptable in the name of that goal. The survival instinct comes into play at the strategic level.

And now we reach the crux of the matter. Who defines the level of threat our nation is faced with? When one man, full of adrenaline, is faced with a life or death situation, there is little doubt in his mind that he is fighting for his existence. Perhaps those removed from the scene and unable to gauge that threat might think differently (as in the case with the Marine), but that is irrelevant to someone making split-second decisions intended to save his own life.

James Doolittle in 1954:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed object is world domination by whatever means and whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct no longer apply.... We must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us.

James Woolsey in 2002:

But, I would say this. Both to the terrorists and to the pathological predators such as Saddam Hussein and to the autocrats as well, the barbarics, the Saudi royal family. They have to realize that now for the fourth time in 100 years, we’ve been awakened and this country is on the march. We didn’t choose this fight, but we’re in it. And being on the march, there’s only one way we’re going to be able to win it. It’s the way we won World War I fighting for Wilson’s 14 points. The way we won World War II fighting for Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter and the way we won World War III fighting for the noble ideas I think best expressed by President Reagan, but also very importantly at the beginning by President Truman, that this was not a war of us against them. It was not a war of countries. It was a war of freedom against tyranny.

This is the debate that we find ourselves in today - much as we found ourselves reevaluating the Cold War as it progressed. What is the level of threat we face? What is the appropriate response? How much must we sacrifice the spectator's ideals of morality and ethics to ensure our survival in the arena of the real world? How should our individual soldiers respond to an enemy that has no legal, ethical, or moral limits? How should our nation respond? And how do we codify this? Judging from past responses, the United States has tended to move aggressively to counter threats, often shoving aside basic freedoms routinely guaranteed to Americans. Then time, protest, investigation (Stout), and debate (“Foreign Intelligence”) have reestablished those freedoms ("Sedition Act"). Slowly, we see the most extreme measures of post-9/11 policies being exposed and rolled back - or at least vigorously debated. And so we enter the most difficult stage of this debate: reaching common ground on how serious a threat we are faced with and then debating how far we slide our ethics scale to combat it. As a nation, we must remember two points: human survival instinct will, at times, bypass morality as the strongest influence on our actions; more importantly however, that same survival instinct can and must be shaped by our ethical underpinnings - at both the individual and collective levels

The descent back into chaos continues in Somalia.

While I'm not ready just yet to jump on the bandwagon being built here and here (a 'riot' consisting of hundreds within a city as large as Mogadishu does not necessarily tell us the true majority view within the city), I am fairly certain that Somalia - and those seeking to prevent Somalia from becoming another breeding ground for terror (similar to Afghanistan of old) - was better off under the stabilizing hands of the Islamic Courts Union.

Will the Ethiopians benefit from intervention? If they play it right, they may. But playing it right, from the Ethiopian perspective probably looks like withdrawal sooner rather than later - regardless of Somalia's stability. Far better (and cheaper) for them to regroup, refit, and wait to cross the border again to throw out the Islamists if (when?) they return to power and begin pushing policies damaging to Ethiopian interests. In fact, by withdrawing quickly and making it clear to the Islamist leadership that they'll be back if Somali talk returns to intervention or meddling in Ethiopia, Ethiopia may gain the most.

For the Islamists, any sort of staged attacks that occur near the Ethiopian withdrawal will strengthen their hand...as will continued chaos in Mogadishu under the current "government." It won't take long for ordinary Somalians to look back favorably on the stability provided by the ICU.

So what does "right" look like at this point? Good question. This editorial from the WaPost offers some ideas but requires the commitment of competent African forces (that won't be viewed as occupiers) and US willingness to act as (or find an) honest broker for negotiations between the UN-supported "government" and the ICU. I'd call it a long shot but probably the best for Somalia, the region, and US efforts to prevent a more aggressively jihadi-style government rising within Somalia.

What does "right" look like in the longer term? Maybe this:

Gayle Smith, a long-time observer of Somalia now with the Center for American Progress, cautioned against a US approach that focuses more on combating terrorism than dealing with the underlying frailty of Somalia which allowed the radicalism to take root in the first place.

"The crisis we're seeing is an outgrowth of a war on terror that we've defined pretty much as a global game of 'gotcha' -- of trying to capture a lot of terrorists, which is important, but without also doing the much harder long term work of dealing with weak and failing states," she said.

Hezbollah doesn't use human shields!

I'm super serious!

A 'Victory' to satisfy Arab (Muslim?) Pride

For those who don't remember, 1973 was the last time Arab Muslims rejoiced in the sort of "we didn't get our asses completely kicked so we won" manner shown by much of the Arab/Muslim public today.

Also for those who don't remember, there was a profound sense of disgust among much of the Arab public following the collapse of Iraqi Army resistance in 2003. Arab - and Muslim - pride is tied into any Arab effort against Western-based or modeled armies. In fact, I think one could argue that 'victory' against the Israelis in 1973 (at least in comparision to 1967...), the Russians in Afghanistan (regardless of the relatively minor role played by Arab Afghans), the ongoing insurgency vs. America in Iraq, and this 'victory' by Hezbollah all serve to build Arab pride. There is a pride in the jihadist, a pride in a developing "Arab" style of fighting that seems to so befuddle the West, and there is a growing pride in those non-state entities that have mastered this sort of fighting.

This likely does not bode well for Israel, the US, or most of the autocracies of the Middle East (other than the Arab-Muslim populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Yes, he's Persian...but his style appeals to this new sense of Middle Eastern Muslim pride.

Did Israel bite off more than they could militarily chew when they chose to go after Hezbollah...and much of the rest of Lebanon in the process? Was there any way Israel COULD have achieved a strictly military victory under these conditions?

UPDATE:

As the dust settles, contrarian opinions regarding Hezbollah's victory arise.

This is 'strategy?'

Okay...so Israel clears everyone out of the land between their border and the Litani river:

If Hezbollah are fish that swim in a sea of the people, using Mao Tse Tung's analogy, then Israel has determined to drain the sea. Certainly Hezbollahis will also move northward, but in doing so they will be pushed further and further out of rocket range, especially the Katyusha rockets, which comprise at least 90 percent of what they have fired into Israel.

Er...then what? Hezbollah mysteriously vanishes? Hezbollah's sponsors DON'T merely provide them with more effective weapons to engage Israel from deeper in Lebanon? Lebanese support for Hezbollah won't increase as Israel razes hundreds of thousands of homes and businesses in southern Lebanon? This is not a 'desired end state' - this is a push for a temporary solution that will, in the end, strengthen Hezbollah and other radical organizations in the region.

Israel cannot simply make Hezbollah disappear through military action. All they can REALLY do through military action is temporarily weaken Hezbollah in a manner that will likely strengthen them in the long term. I can't imagine Israel really wants that.

UPDATE:

Obviously I'm not alone in my beliefs. For the record: it's possible to be pro-Israeli without thinking Israel's current military operation (or military strategy) makes sense. I know...hard for much of the right side of the blogosphere to believe....

So I guess we're living in Turkey now.

Fascinating (well...'fascinating' seems too plain a word to describe the sort of mass ignorance required for this) poll results from the US...that, eerily, match up all too well with polls taken in the Muslim world of late. From the Scripps poll of Americans (via Seattle PI):

More than a third of the American public suspects that federal officials assisted in the 9/11 terrorist attacks or took no action to stop them so the United States could go to war in the Middle East, according to a new Scripps Howard/Ohio University poll.

From a recent Pew survey of Muslim countries:

In one of the survey’s most striking findings, majorities in Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan say that they do not believe groups of Arabs carried out the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The percentage of Turks expressing disbelief that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks has increased from 43% in a 2002 Gallup survey to 59% currently. And this attitude is not limited to Muslims in predominantly Muslim countries – 56% of British Muslims say they do not believe Arabs carried out the terror attacks against the U.S., compared with just 17% who do.

To put a positive spin on things...should we take heart that the world is coming together in their beliefs? Just because they're nonsense - and perhaps a vivid example of the dangers associated with the Information Age - shouldn't discourage us, right? Right...?

Huh?

I can only assume he's joking:

"The world prayed that after the unilateral departure of Israel from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and the recent elections in Beirut and the West Bank, it was witnessing an incremental evolution toward a lasting peace between rational democratic states. Gradually, Israel was returning to its 1967 borders. In response, gradually, it was hoped, Israel's Arab neighbors would vote into office reasonable statesmen who would renounce terror and get on with the business of crafting workable economies and governments. But all that optimism presupposed a radical change in the Middle Eastern mentality. Unfortunately, that hasn't happened." [emphasis added]

Did ANYone (perhaps besides Mr. Hanson) - to include most Israelis - really believe that Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza would lead naturally to a return to its 1967 borders? Ariel Sharon certainly didn't:

Enjoying a moment of international sympathy, Sharon's government is moving swiftly to capitalize on its unilateral withdrawal and ongoing demolition of 25 Jewish settlements. The government's efforts are focused largely in the West Bank, land of far more religious and strategic importance to Israel than the remote slice of coastline it has left behind.

A little more than 31,000 Israelis live in Maale Adumim, a suburban settlement built on land captured by Israel in the 1967 Middle East war. Israeli officials say it will grow to more than 50,000 people and eventually touch the edge of East Jerusalem, even though the U.S. government and Palestinian leaders have said that such growth would severely complicate efforts to establish a viable Palestinian state.

So as we delve into the justifications that terror organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas use in targeting Israel, let's make sure we accurately gauge Israeli actions...and understand how these actions have given groups like Hezbollah and Hamas far more 'street cred' than they deserve.

Sticky wicket? I think not...

While I agree with the vast majority of Bill Lind's statement regarding the danger Israel faces with its current course of action (and the benefits it offers to Hezbollah), I disagree with a portion of this:

"An interesting theoretical speculation is whether, if Hezbollah’s 4GW success continues, some Middle Eastern governments might try adopting Fourth Generation techniques themselves. Lebanon’s fictional government has suggested the Lebanese Army may join Hezbollah in defending southern Lebanon from an Israeli invasion. Militarily, such an action would be meaningless, and it probably reflects a desperate desire to keep the Lebanese Army (which is 40% Shiite) from fractioning, along with Lebanon itself. But what if instead the government called for a million marchers, mostly women and children, to head toward the Lebanese-Israeli frontier, waving palm branches and singing songs? That’s how Morocco took the Spanish Sahara, and it would present Israel with a sticky wicket indeed." [emphasis added]

In fact, such an action HAS already been suggested by Lebanese bloggers. Will it actually come to pass? I would imagine not. That being said...

At this point, Israel should be so lucky. Such an action by the Lebanese people, quite apart from representing a difficult decision for Israel, would offer one of the few face-saving escapes for Israel at this point...a valid reason to cease their ineffective military campaign...a chance to show the world they can be swayed by humanitarian concerns...a chance to demonstrate that someone OTHER than Hezbollah was responsible for Israeli retreat from a no-win situation.

Then again, I question whether Israel's military leaders would have the depth of vision to recognize such an act as an opportunity.

How is this not obvious?

From a Hezbollah fighter quoted in the Guardian:

"Despite Israel's claims to have inflicted heavy losses on Hizbullah, Ali insists his side is in a strong position. "Things are going very well now, whatever happens we are winning. If they keep bombing us we will stay in the shelters, and with each bomb more people support the resistance. If they invade they will repeat the miserable fate they had in 1982, and if they hold one square foot they will give the Islamic resistance all the legitimacy. If they want to kill Hizbullah they have to kill every Shia in the south of Lebanon."

And hey, whatever happened to Hezbollah being so hard to find because they never mix with civilians? Thanks, Salon.

The Israeli military continues to stand ready to pummel any organized Arab army that threatens it...and continues to stand completely unprepared to deal with their actual enemies (or at least the strategies adopted by their nation-state enemies - Syria and Iran).