How do we gauge momentum?

I was reminded, as I viewed my viewing stats (a quite easy task for those of us who count page views with one or two hands...), that I made a rather bold assumption shortly after the elections in Iraq. For the first few months, the attack levels in Iraq and the initial momentum of the political process seemed to bear my assumption out. Momentum clearly shifted...and it did so noticeably enough to raise the interest of a generally jaded press corps (which is really saying something, when you think about it).

The result of this momentum shift was a series of over-enthusiastic statements (such as my own) that failed to take into account the ruthlessness of the insurgency - or its adaptability.

As the new Iraqi government struggled to move ahead, insurgents took advantage of this strategic pause by orchestrating a devastating suicide bombing campaign designed to delegitimize the government (by targeting Iraqi security forces), foment sectarian conflict (by targeting Shia neighborhoods, mosques, and leaders), cow Sunnis seeking reconciliation (by targeting any Sunnis talking to or working with the government), and rattle American public opinion (both by targeting American forces and establishing a sense of chaos as reporters breathlessly reported on each suicide attack).

In response, American units and Iraqi security forces became quicker on the trigger as cars approached convoys and patrols. Iraqi citizens became less willing to approach these forces (often blaming security forces when civilians were killed during suicide attacks on those same forces). And the advantage in the media war clearly shifted back to the insurgents. Using limited numbers of attackers, they were able to portray a sense of disorder, disunity, and chaos - with just 2-5 attacks per day.

Combined with the steady stream of (generally ineffective) IED attacks, Iraq is viewed as 'less secure' than a year ago when large elements of insurgents were free to move through much of Baghdad and mass forces to attack Iraqi security elements. And, of course, because the memory of that creature known as 'public opinion' tends to be so short, an increase in isolated attacks (essentially economy of force operations by the insurgents) are viewed as worse than the largely unreported chaos of 8 months or a year ago (when reporters were often unable to find sources that could report on these large insurgent groups because no one could access the areas from which they operated).

So what does all that really mean? Simple. Strategic momentum has returned to the hands of the insurgency and it will take something more than increased military operations to switch it back - since the battle is often just as much for public opinion as it is for anything else. And thus we see American diplomatic pressure on Iraqi lawmakers to meet political deadlines.

I have a mixed opinion on that pressure. While I understand the symbolic importance of meeting deadlines (which is why holding the elections as scheduled was so important at the start of the year), it is also important to produce a draft constitution that is satisfactory to all sides - and doesn't put off too many tough decisions until later. If those decisions are pushed back too far, we will likely see a repeat of the infighting and disorder that followed the elections as the different factions jockeyed to position themselves as king of the hill.

But back to my original question. How do we gauge momentum? Do we gauge it by attacks? Casualties? Political successes? The series of small Coalition victories often highlighted by Chrenkoff and crew? The series of deadly attacks often highlighted by the media? The blogs of soldiers currently in the fight? The blogs of Iraqi nationals?

I wish I knew.

Tags:

Iraq
4th Generation Warfare
Insurgency