From the WaPost
Sunni Insurgents Ascendant in Iraq's Caldron of Violence - washingtonpost.com
Interesting split in strategies between the two main insurgent protagonists. The Shia lay low (likely in hopes of waiting out the surge...a lesson learned from the bloody 2004 battles with the Coalition?) while Sunni insurgent groups shoot to paint the surge as a failure - perhaps in the hope of driving the US out of Iraq before ISF (or Shia militias...or a merger of the two) are capable of dealing with them, creating the conditions for a failed state in which they are likely to retain more freedom of maneuver (as opposed to having the combined weight of the Iraqi state's security organs plus the Shia militias turned upon them). It'll be interesting to see who's gamble pays off here. I'd like to bet on the Shia simply because putting their heads down makes them more likely to get tied up into the political process if the surge manages to set the stage for it.
7 comments:
It's hard to game out anything working out well anytime soon for the Sunnis. More room for maneuver in a failed state would still suck because of the mismatch of force and population. In almost any circumstance, bar a regional war that gets them outside help, payback is going to be a real bitch.
And, I dont think there's anyway the American people would stick up for them when the true payback comes considering the past 4 years. I remember daily the good men, both the ones dear to me, and the ones I never actually knew, that they killed.
It seems an issue of strategic importance that we are doubling-down on the pre-2003 alliances with the Sunni Arab world when none of them can bring the Sunnis of Iraq onboard. There is a huge mismatch betwen the regional system we have been building since FDR and King Saud met in the 40s and the operational campaign within Iraq, IMHO. We shouldnt still be fighting in Anbar if the regional system was working.
If there is a mismatch between strategy and operations, military science suggests strategic rethink, no?
Some good questions and comments, Dan. I don't think the Sunni plan (such as it is...we always have to remember the fractured nature of the insurgency there) is to appeal to American sympathies. I think it is much more to appeal to the international Jihadist movement. As long as Sunni insurgent leaders can appeal to the anti-Shia sentiment within the civilian populations of surrounding Arab states, they're likely to have money, resources, and manpower - more than they can expect from us at this point.
I think one of the problems with the regional system we've built since the 40s is that it was predicated on the notion that States had far more power than Individuals. No longer the case. Leads to a need to reevaluate strategy, as you mention, doesn't it?
Tim, my read of the current situation is that sunni nationalists are done with the jihadist alliance and the two sides are duking it out? am i misreading or buying into some info/ops type thing?
On the strategy question, im thinking lately that we may have to simply run with the regional Sunni/Shia split and choose a side? Is that too simplistic?
You're only misreading in that you are assuming too much consensus of opinion among Sunni insurgent and political groups. In Anbar, there is *A* tribal coalition battling against the more extremist AQI fighters (and associated coalition). There are no such coalitiona among Sunni insurgent elements operating in places such as Baghdad, Diyala, Mosul, Kirkuk, Samarra, etc. Those are straight up Sunni rejectionist/nationalists/criminals who are occasionally in cahoots with AQI and occasionally not.
From the strategic perspective...difficult question. During the 80s, we played Iran and Iraq off against each other in the hopes of balancing the two sides...probably didn't go all that well for us in the end, huh?
And then, of course, there's the added complication of weakened States to contend with. Leaders within Sunni countries do not like the Iranian leadership. They do not like Shia power-grabbing. HOWEVER...many of the (Sunni) citizens within these states really like Ahmadinejad's Islamist-populist message despite the fact it's coming from a Shiite (and a Persian at that). To try playing straight along the split between Sunni and Shia doesn't get us very far at this point. And siding with one or the other is difficult if not impossible given the fractured power base on both sides.
Tough dilemma. Best solved after we've made some ugly compromises to stabilize Iraq and get out. That's probably the biggest flaw of the Bush Administration in their dealings in the region...we have to see some shades of gray to achieve temporary objectives that lead us toward our preferred strategic outcome. Bush and crew don't want to make those compromises.
How would u sketch our overall strategic goals in the Persian Gulf region and the Islamic world as a whole?
Hm. VERY tough question...and probably above my 'pay grade' to answer. I don't think I've done enough research on the matter above the level of military operational to strategic to offer useful insight into the political/grand strategic perspective.
My gut feeling tells me much of what needs to be done to talk the Middle East down from the edge of the roof revolves around energy independence and forcing the key power players to develop real economies - while coming to grips with the fact that their power is built simply upon oil wealth and little else.
To that end, it probably makes sense to balance the key players without forcing change until that change is forced naturally by the need to alter their economic structures. Forced change has worked to no one's advantage - and I'd include Iran in that as well. By being pushed to the forefront, their many internal weaknesses and contradictions are likely to surface more quickly. PLUS...we have a whole heck of a lot more ability to influence energy consumption and oil use than we have ability to influence the governments and various power blocks within the region. Again, a lesson learned from our intervention in Iraq.
The toughest element in undermining the power of oil remains other economies - especially China (since they don't give a rat's ass where they get energy resources - or from whom. As long as they get it). But better energy sources developed by American research and available to the Chinese could change that outlook. We just need to get to the point where we can actually offer real alternatives without radically altering our lifestyle - because the electorate isn't ready for that sort of sacrifice at this point.
So...the secret to success in the Middle East likely rests outside the Middle East. That make any sense?
Makes a helluva lot of sense! :)
It makes so much sense b/c its one that is humble and simple and offers some chance of an alternative to more bloodshed. I'll be pondering it for a bit. Thanks for the idea-changer!
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