Is that an exit strategy...or victory?

I just finished reading William Lind's article on an Exit Strategy from Iraq. Many of his ideas aren't bad but I'm surprised by the statement:

Please note that I am not talking about how to win the Iraq war. The war was lost from before the first bomb fell, because the strategic objectives were never attainable no matter what we did. Further blunders, from de-Baathification and sending the Iraqi Army home through mistreating the civilian population, have moved us from mere failure to incipient disaster. The question, rather, is how we might get out without our defeat being so obvious as to be undeniable.

I would argue that we have not yet reached failure and do not stand on the cusp of incipient disaster – from a strictly military perspective. Our failure has been to understand that the American center of gravity has not changed since Vietnam. It remains American public opinion. Viewed from THAT angle…yes, there has been a failure. On the verge of incipient disaster? No. Public opinion has not yet begun to solidify so firmly in the anti-war camp as to force our hand militarily.

The question how to get out without defeat being obvious seems foolish – especially considering the terms Mr. Lind discusses in the rest of the article. An American withdrawal that is based upon a secure and stable Iraq with a popularly elected government and little tolerance for supporting terror does not represent failure. It represents the sort of success we should have aimed for initially. Simply failing to reach the foolishly high expectations of Bush’s policymakers does not represent failure – it represents a better understanding of the situation on the ground and what the best case scenario is (and was from the beginning of this venture).

All that being said, most of his suggestions are sound. However, many are also being implemented by the military leadership within Iraq. And here we reach the limits of advice from an observer too far removed from the fight. On paper, his ideas all work wonderfully and, before you know it, the boys are home safe and sound. In the messy reality of war, implementation of these ideas is difficult and requires constant adaptation – often to the point where the original concept can be difficult to recognize as it is executed. Anyway…here are his ideas:

First, announce that we will leave Iraq soon, and completely. Not one American base or soldier will remain on Iraqi soil. The spin should be, “We came only to remove Saddam from power, and we have accomplished that mission. Iraq now has a constitution and an elected government; we have no reason to remain.”

I’m not so sure about this one. Lay out the conditions under which we would consider withdrawal? Yeah. I’m all for that. But I think the military has done a lot of that already. A firm timeline for withdrawal risks creating the sort of conditions we’ve seen in Gaza as Hamas and Islamic Jihad gain greater credibility since withdrawal can just as easily be linked with their actions as with anything else. This emboldens and strengthens the terrorist cause.

Second, open negotiations to set a date by which we will be gone. The formal negotiations will be with the Iraqi government. Behind the scenes, we will have to set a deadline for achieving an agreement, failing which we will announce a withdrawal unilaterally.

I can only assume the deadline will be an internal date rather than something laid out to the Iraqi government. If used as a tool to influence their government, it will simply leak out and damage the negotiations.

Governments established by foreign powers may be reluctant to see foreign troops leave.

A misnomer. The current government is NOT established by foreign powers – and the government with which most of these negotiations would take place (after the 15^th of December) will likely be both more representative of the population as a whole (with more Sunni representation) and less in the hands of the current power blocs (blocs which the US certainly only has limited ability to influence right now).

The critical (and secret) negotiations, however, will not be with Iraq’s puppet government, but with the Sunnis. Here, what we need is what is sometimes called a “diplomatic revolution.” Instead of siding with the Kurds and Shiites against the Sunnis, we need to offer the Sunnis an alliance. The terms would be roughly these:

1. We will set and adhere to a date for complete withdrawal;

2. We will cease all attacks on the Sunni resistance, as part of a mutual cease-fire; and

3. We will use such political influence as we retain with Iraq’s Shiite-Kurdish condominium to protect and advance the Sunnis’ interests.

In return, the Sunnis will:

1. Enforce a cease-fire in the Sunni provinces, and

2. Clean up al Qaeda in Iraq. If they need and want our help to do that, we will help. I doubt they will need any assistance from us, beyond stopping our attacks in Sunni areas, and I doubt even more they will want it, since it would de-legitimize them.

For those not paying much attention at home…we’re already pretty much at this point. Most of the pressure being applied to the interim government has been in support of the Sunni minority. That is likely to continue. As for ceasing all attacks on the Sunni resistance in return for a cease fire…I would think that an advocate of 4^th Generation Warfare who routinely discusses the loose hierarchy of a network-based opponent would understand this is essentially impossible. There IS no one element to negotiate a cease fire with. If we were dealing with a hierarchical organization, this MIGHT be feasible. As it stands…nope. Can’t be done. Perhaps negotiations with individual leaders who control key nodes or movements within the network could help – but talking with those lower level leaders will never lead to the conditions for a full withdrawal. And we always run the risk of talking ourselves into another situation similar to that encountered in Fallujah during the spring and summer of 2004.

Third, while we will cease our useless “sweeps” and other clearly offensive actions, we will also quietly institute the “ink-blot strategy” in some mixed Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish areas. While the ink-blot strategy (like the CAP program in Vietnam) represents a strategic offensive, which allows us to keep pressure on the Sunnis to make a deal, it requires de-escalation on the tactical level, so as not to alienate the local population. That should help reduce both Sunni and American casualties while negotiations proceed.

Sweeps are not useless and prevent the insurgency from establishing permanent bases of operation. That being said, they are not always the best use of resources and, if improperly conducted, can increase the support base for the insurgency rather than reducing it. The ink-blot strategy IS being utilized but, again, a “strategy” written on paper will not look the same when it is applied in reality. Tal Afar, Fallujah, Baghdad, and Mosul all represent modified version of the ink blot strategy – a strategy that will continue as more Iraqi units become capable of controlling real estate.

As I have noted in previous columns, a problem in Fourth Generation conflicts is finding someone with whom to negotiate, someone who can deliver once a deal is made. Here, events in Iraq may have given us an opportunity. According to the October 27 Christian Science Monitor, Iraq’s key Sunni political parties have formed a new coalition. That coalition is, to quote the Monitor, “Islamist, vehemently anti-American, opposed to foreign troops, and discreetly pro-insurgency.” I think it is safe to add that it is closely tied to the Baathist elements of the insurgency, which are both a large part of the resistance and strongly opposed to al Qaeda.

All those characteristics make it a credible negotiating partner. Negotiations with Sunni Quislings serve no purpose, because the Quislings can’t deliver what we need, a quieting down of the fighting while we get out. There is good reason to think the new Sunni coalition could deliver that. In turn, we could deliver what they need, which is political support vis-à-vis the Shiites and Kurds.

I would assume William understands there are already a great many attempts at negotiation with groups like this. And I would assume he further understands that those negotiations are only possible when the US puts pressure on the Shiites and Kurds…and lets them know that we are NOT in Iraq simply to advance the interests of the current Shiite and Kurd leaders. That is where it becomes important to move (slowly) along the lines Mr. Lind speaks of. Continue to negotiate with all who gain from a cessation of violence. Ensure the interim government (and the next government) understands there just isn’t enough hammer available to quell the Sunni insurgency through force.

What’s my bottom line? William overstates the weakness of the American position, understates the degree to which many of his ideas are already being pursued by leaders on the ground, oversimplifies the means through which we can negotiate deals with elements of the insurgency, and admits defeat where there is (currently) none to be found.

All that being said, he is right in stating that we need to begin considering how to remove our troops from Iraq. Why? Because we HAVE met most of the reasonable (let me stress that again…REASONABLE) pre-war goals for the invasion. He is also right in that we are currently best served advancing Sunni issues rather than Shiite and Kurd. If the Iraqi interim government WAS a puppet regime, this would be unnecessary since we could simply dictate terms. It is not. They have their own ideas for how to govern the country, how to interact with the Sunnis, and how to deal with the insurgency. Our job, at this point, is to intercede strongly enough to make that interaction occur more in the political than military sphere. Our OTHER job is to determine how we can continue to interdict foreign fighters and jihadists without strengthening support for the more “nationalist” Sunni insurgency.

Tags:

William Lind
Iraq
Exit Strategy