A misjudgment by both sides

In reading the latest round of blogger sniping at the media over Iraq (much of it justified, by the way...), I still find reason to contradict the meme, most clearly identified by Jim Dunnigan (and reinforced by Austin Bay) that "First, there is definitely a terrorism problem. Not an insurgency, not a guerilla war, not a resistance."

Let's take a closer look at that.

Through most of the country, terrorism is clearly a much greater problem than insurgency...but to speak of only those terms, is to avoid the real problems we have yet to overcome: a barely contained civil war that is driving a deep wedge between ethnic and sectarian factions, and rampant corruption within the larger Iraqi ministries.

These two problems, if not solved, will limit our ability to successfully withdraw troops - and limit the Iraqi government's ability to resist attack from the incipient insurgency that flourishes throughout much of the Sunni-dominated western provinces (and yes...I mean "insurgency" and not "terrorism"). The success of the Coalition and Iraqi security forces in pushing the insurgency down to terrorism has changed the dynamics in major cities like Mosul and Baghdad but it has not done the same out west...and it will be difficult to bring that change about. The Sunni insurgency has suffered horrific casualties...but, to a certain extent, the more blood invested in the insurgency, the less likely they are to quietly put down their weapons.

Gradually quelling violence in the majority of the country is well within the means of the Iraqi security forces as they now stand. Developing a government that finds room for all of the angry factions - and convincing Sunni insurgents to lay down their weapons when the military remains a largely Shia/Kurd institution will be much more difficult.

So why are so few of Iraq's military units rated as capable of standing on their own? A lack of tactical or operational skill? Maybe compared to US units they lack skill...but that isn't the problem. The problem is a complete lack of infrastructure to sustain these increasingly well-trained units. That lack of infrastructure is generated by corruption, power plays among Shia, Kurd, and Sunni leaders, and the general Iraqi government belief that, in the end, the US will throw more money at the problem...so why worry about accountability? Until the Iraqi government gets a handle on these issues, very few units (regardless of their tactical or operational proficiency) will earn the title "capable of independent operations."

So...the situation remains much more complex than either side of the American debate likes to admit. If we leave now, chaos will follow (and for those who think there's chaos now...you ain't seen nothing yet). If we don't force the Iraqi system to begin functioning (or NOT functioning so people can recognize the problems and move to correct them), staying the course will get us nowhere...and endlessly killing insurgents, finding caches, or disrupting the insurgent network will not move us closer to "victory" - a secure and stable Iraq with a government responsible to its own people.

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Iraq
Austin Bay
James Dunnigan