It's amazing that these stories can gain traction

Um...yeah. Bush was gonna bomb Al-Jazeera's headquarters. In Dubai. I heard he's going to invade Mars, as well.

The 'public record' is now set. No matter how much work is done to dismantle a story so ridiculous, it has sloshed through the news cycle for long enough to gain the veneer of 'truth.' From here on out, we can assume any efforts to establish fact will be viewed as 'spin.'

And I guess that's when we see the downside of connectivity and the 24/7 news cycle. As this story circulated and got picked up by more and more services, it moved from perception to reality....

Rest assured, it's on the wish list.

Thomas Barnett has a new book out. From my interpretation of this review, it appears he has elaborated on his theory first presented in The Pentagon's New Map.

I liked the first book...and it sounds as if he has updated his ideas based on further research, the ongoing struggle in Iraq, and the sort of second-guessing that is required to properly develop any theory.

Are you listening, Santa...?

Has the whole process sped up?

The CS Monitor discusses the rapid loss of support for the war in Iraq...and attributes at least some of it to the speed of the news cycle:

Not helping the president has been the modern phenomenon of 24/7 cable news coverage, which brings instant magnification to the daily death toll and the longstanding media practice of focusing on negative developments.

The Monitor story also covers the after-effects of both the Vietnam War and the Cold War - an increase in support for isolationist policies (a trait that lasted at least through most of the 70s following Vietnam).

I wonder, though, how long such a hangover would last following an early withdrawal from Iraq. It isn't merely the news cycle that has sped up. The pace of change...and the speed with which new opinions tend to build strength in today's media world (to include the blogosphere) continues to increase.

Much as support for the war has rapidly disintegrated, I think the post-withdrawal reaction would be short as well. It will be strong, it will be bitterly contested, but it will fade quickly as other events replace it in the nonstop news/opinion cycle.

It's an interesting dynamic. I don't think we'll ever see the sort of extended status quo we saw during the Cold War - or the sort of collective depression that seemed to grip the United States for nearly a decade following our withdrawal from Vietnam. The world is too connected. There are too many issues that might once have seemed "foreign" and now seem to have immediate impact on everyday domestic life. Change, pushed along by globalization, mixing of diverse opinions, and growth of lesser nations will likely be the constant we become familiar with. In such an environment, any attempts to slip into an isolationist shell are unlikely to survive even a single election cycle.

technorati tags: iraq, csmonitor

A misjudgment by both sides

In reading the latest round of blogger sniping at the media over Iraq (much of it justified, by the way...), I still find reason to contradict the meme, most clearly identified by Jim Dunnigan (and reinforced by Austin Bay) that "First, there is definitely a terrorism problem. Not an insurgency, not a guerilla war, not a resistance."

Let's take a closer look at that.

Through most of the country, terrorism is clearly a much greater problem than insurgency...but to speak of only those terms, is to avoid the real problems we have yet to overcome: a barely contained civil war that is driving a deep wedge between ethnic and sectarian factions, and rampant corruption within the larger Iraqi ministries.

These two problems, if not solved, will limit our ability to successfully withdraw troops - and limit the Iraqi government's ability to resist attack from the incipient insurgency that flourishes throughout much of the Sunni-dominated western provinces (and yes...I mean "insurgency" and not "terrorism"). The success of the Coalition and Iraqi security forces in pushing the insurgency down to terrorism has changed the dynamics in major cities like Mosul and Baghdad but it has not done the same out west...and it will be difficult to bring that change about. The Sunni insurgency has suffered horrific casualties...but, to a certain extent, the more blood invested in the insurgency, the less likely they are to quietly put down their weapons.

Gradually quelling violence in the majority of the country is well within the means of the Iraqi security forces as they now stand. Developing a government that finds room for all of the angry factions - and convincing Sunni insurgents to lay down their weapons when the military remains a largely Shia/Kurd institution will be much more difficult.

So why are so few of Iraq's military units rated as capable of standing on their own? A lack of tactical or operational skill? Maybe compared to US units they lack skill...but that isn't the problem. The problem is a complete lack of infrastructure to sustain these increasingly well-trained units. That lack of infrastructure is generated by corruption, power plays among Shia, Kurd, and Sunni leaders, and the general Iraqi government belief that, in the end, the US will throw more money at the problem...so why worry about accountability? Until the Iraqi government gets a handle on these issues, very few units (regardless of their tactical or operational proficiency) will earn the title "capable of independent operations."

So...the situation remains much more complex than either side of the American debate likes to admit. If we leave now, chaos will follow (and for those who think there's chaos now...you ain't seen nothing yet). If we don't force the Iraqi system to begin functioning (or NOT functioning so people can recognize the problems and move to correct them), staying the course will get us nowhere...and endlessly killing insurgents, finding caches, or disrupting the insurgent network will not move us closer to "victory" - a secure and stable Iraq with a government responsible to its own people.

Tags:


Iraq
Austin Bay
James Dunnigan

Fry 'em

I would call this a good chance to demonstrate the meaning of transparent government. Much of the work done by the CPA will be hard to track and investigate - simply because there were many GOOD folks out there making things happen in an environment where receipts, competitive bidding, or firm pricing were absolutely unheard of. The great work THEY did needs to be separated from the work of those who chose to use that system for their own personal gain.

technorati tags: iraq, CPA, corruption

Just like the Reeses commercials of old

"You got Google in my Yahoo!"

"You got Yahoo on my Google!"

Hm...

Is that an exit strategy...or victory?

I just finished reading William Lind's article on an Exit Strategy from Iraq. Many of his ideas aren't bad but I'm surprised by the statement:

Please note that I am not talking about how to win the Iraq war. The war was lost from before the first bomb fell, because the strategic objectives were never attainable no matter what we did. Further blunders, from de-Baathification and sending the Iraqi Army home through mistreating the civilian population, have moved us from mere failure to incipient disaster. The question, rather, is how we might get out without our defeat being so obvious as to be undeniable.

I would argue that we have not yet reached failure and do not stand on the cusp of incipient disaster – from a strictly military perspective. Our failure has been to understand that the American center of gravity has not changed since Vietnam. It remains American public opinion. Viewed from THAT angle…yes, there has been a failure. On the verge of incipient disaster? No. Public opinion has not yet begun to solidify so firmly in the anti-war camp as to force our hand militarily.

The question how to get out without defeat being obvious seems foolish – especially considering the terms Mr. Lind discusses in the rest of the article. An American withdrawal that is based upon a secure and stable Iraq with a popularly elected government and little tolerance for supporting terror does not represent failure. It represents the sort of success we should have aimed for initially. Simply failing to reach the foolishly high expectations of Bush’s policymakers does not represent failure – it represents a better understanding of the situation on the ground and what the best case scenario is (and was from the beginning of this venture).

All that being said, most of his suggestions are sound. However, many are also being implemented by the military leadership within Iraq. And here we reach the limits of advice from an observer too far removed from the fight. On paper, his ideas all work wonderfully and, before you know it, the boys are home safe and sound. In the messy reality of war, implementation of these ideas is difficult and requires constant adaptation – often to the point where the original concept can be difficult to recognize as it is executed. Anyway…here are his ideas:

First, announce that we will leave Iraq soon, and completely. Not one American base or soldier will remain on Iraqi soil. The spin should be, “We came only to remove Saddam from power, and we have accomplished that mission. Iraq now has a constitution and an elected government; we have no reason to remain.”

I’m not so sure about this one. Lay out the conditions under which we would consider withdrawal? Yeah. I’m all for that. But I think the military has done a lot of that already. A firm timeline for withdrawal risks creating the sort of conditions we’ve seen in Gaza as Hamas and Islamic Jihad gain greater credibility since withdrawal can just as easily be linked with their actions as with anything else. This emboldens and strengthens the terrorist cause.

Second, open negotiations to set a date by which we will be gone. The formal negotiations will be with the Iraqi government. Behind the scenes, we will have to set a deadline for achieving an agreement, failing which we will announce a withdrawal unilaterally.

I can only assume the deadline will be an internal date rather than something laid out to the Iraqi government. If used as a tool to influence their government, it will simply leak out and damage the negotiations.

Governments established by foreign powers may be reluctant to see foreign troops leave.

A misnomer. The current government is NOT established by foreign powers – and the government with which most of these negotiations would take place (after the 15^th of December) will likely be both more representative of the population as a whole (with more Sunni representation) and less in the hands of the current power blocs (blocs which the US certainly only has limited ability to influence right now).

The critical (and secret) negotiations, however, will not be with Iraq’s puppet government, but with the Sunnis. Here, what we need is what is sometimes called a “diplomatic revolution.” Instead of siding with the Kurds and Shiites against the Sunnis, we need to offer the Sunnis an alliance. The terms would be roughly these:

1. We will set and adhere to a date for complete withdrawal;

2. We will cease all attacks on the Sunni resistance, as part of a mutual cease-fire; and

3. We will use such political influence as we retain with Iraq’s Shiite-Kurdish condominium to protect and advance the Sunnis’ interests.

In return, the Sunnis will:

1. Enforce a cease-fire in the Sunni provinces, and

2. Clean up al Qaeda in Iraq. If they need and want our help to do that, we will help. I doubt they will need any assistance from us, beyond stopping our attacks in Sunni areas, and I doubt even more they will want it, since it would de-legitimize them.

For those not paying much attention at home…we’re already pretty much at this point. Most of the pressure being applied to the interim government has been in support of the Sunni minority. That is likely to continue. As for ceasing all attacks on the Sunni resistance in return for a cease fire…I would think that an advocate of 4^th Generation Warfare who routinely discusses the loose hierarchy of a network-based opponent would understand this is essentially impossible. There IS no one element to negotiate a cease fire with. If we were dealing with a hierarchical organization, this MIGHT be feasible. As it stands…nope. Can’t be done. Perhaps negotiations with individual leaders who control key nodes or movements within the network could help – but talking with those lower level leaders will never lead to the conditions for a full withdrawal. And we always run the risk of talking ourselves into another situation similar to that encountered in Fallujah during the spring and summer of 2004.

Third, while we will cease our useless “sweeps” and other clearly offensive actions, we will also quietly institute the “ink-blot strategy” in some mixed Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish areas. While the ink-blot strategy (like the CAP program in Vietnam) represents a strategic offensive, which allows us to keep pressure on the Sunnis to make a deal, it requires de-escalation on the tactical level, so as not to alienate the local population. That should help reduce both Sunni and American casualties while negotiations proceed.

Sweeps are not useless and prevent the insurgency from establishing permanent bases of operation. That being said, they are not always the best use of resources and, if improperly conducted, can increase the support base for the insurgency rather than reducing it. The ink-blot strategy IS being utilized but, again, a “strategy” written on paper will not look the same when it is applied in reality. Tal Afar, Fallujah, Baghdad, and Mosul all represent modified version of the ink blot strategy – a strategy that will continue as more Iraqi units become capable of controlling real estate.

As I have noted in previous columns, a problem in Fourth Generation conflicts is finding someone with whom to negotiate, someone who can deliver once a deal is made. Here, events in Iraq may have given us an opportunity. According to the October 27 Christian Science Monitor, Iraq’s key Sunni political parties have formed a new coalition. That coalition is, to quote the Monitor, “Islamist, vehemently anti-American, opposed to foreign troops, and discreetly pro-insurgency.” I think it is safe to add that it is closely tied to the Baathist elements of the insurgency, which are both a large part of the resistance and strongly opposed to al Qaeda.

All those characteristics make it a credible negotiating partner. Negotiations with Sunni Quislings serve no purpose, because the Quislings can’t deliver what we need, a quieting down of the fighting while we get out. There is good reason to think the new Sunni coalition could deliver that. In turn, we could deliver what they need, which is political support vis-à-vis the Shiites and Kurds.

I would assume William understands there are already a great many attempts at negotiation with groups like this. And I would assume he further understands that those negotiations are only possible when the US puts pressure on the Shiites and Kurds…and lets them know that we are NOT in Iraq simply to advance the interests of the current Shiite and Kurd leaders. That is where it becomes important to move (slowly) along the lines Mr. Lind speaks of. Continue to negotiate with all who gain from a cessation of violence. Ensure the interim government (and the next government) understands there just isn’t enough hammer available to quell the Sunni insurgency through force.

What’s my bottom line? William overstates the weakness of the American position, understates the degree to which many of his ideas are already being pursued by leaders on the ground, oversimplifies the means through which we can negotiate deals with elements of the insurgency, and admits defeat where there is (currently) none to be found.

All that being said, he is right in stating that we need to begin considering how to remove our troops from Iraq. Why? Because we HAVE met most of the reasonable (let me stress that again…REASONABLE) pre-war goals for the invasion. He is also right in that we are currently best served advancing Sunni issues rather than Shiite and Kurd. If the Iraqi interim government WAS a puppet regime, this would be unnecessary since we could simply dictate terms. It is not. They have their own ideas for how to govern the country, how to interact with the Sunnis, and how to deal with the insurgency. Our job, at this point, is to intercede strongly enough to make that interaction occur more in the political than military sphere. Our OTHER job is to determine how we can continue to interdict foreign fighters and jihadists without strengthening support for the more “nationalist” Sunni insurgency.

Tags:

William Lind
Iraq
Exit Strategy

So where are the drugs and rock-n-roll?

The Sydney Morning Herald documents a popular Arab TV show that takes some of the mystique out of so-called "martyr operations." I think one of the items I find most disturbing in the article (and series) - largely because it fits with other stories I've seen over the past few years (most notably here, here and here) - is the use of sexual frustration (and a promised release) as a recruiting tool for young, devout Islamic males. Some go so far as to accuse Islamists of a serious case of misogyny. Witness this piece from the Herald article:

From the start, Anzour set out to mount a challenge. The name al-Hour al-Eyn (his translation is "The White Maids with Beautiful Big and Lustrous Eyes") represents the 72 virgins who militants believe wait in paradise for the martyrs to jihad. Anzour heard a recording made by Saudi security officials of two militants talking to each other by radio, counting down to a suicide attack. "You hear one of them saying to the other: 'Seven seconds to al-Hour al-Eyn, six seconds to al-Hour al-Eyn, five seconds …' And then the explosion comes," he said. "This really gives you the mentality of these people. I was very affected by this."

Something interesting I noticed while shuffling through websites and reading more deeply into martyrs and their motivation was an attempt by many Western Islamic scholars to dismiss not just sexual frustration...but religion itself as a motive, instead pointing to the more tried and true 'political frustration.' At the leadership level...yeah, I can see that. But to deny Jihadi recruiters are running around selling peep show tickets for the Afterlife to teens and twentysomethings is to deny the very words of those who conduct these operations:

The death announcements of martyrs in the Palestinian press often take the form of wedding, not funeral, announcements. "Blessings will be accepted immediately after the burial and until 10 p.m. …at the home of the martyr's uncle," read one suicide bomber's death notice. "With great pride, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad marries the member of its military wing… the martyr and hero Yasser Al-Adhami, to 'the black-eyed,'" read another.

Al Risala, the Hamas mouthpiece, published the will of Sa'id Al-Hutari, who carried out the June 1, 2001 suicide bombing outside the disco near the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv that killed 23, mostly teenage girls. "I will turn my body into bombs that will hunt the sons of Zion, blast them, and burn their remains," Al-Hutari wrote. "Call out in joy, oh my mother; distribute sweets, oh my father and brothers; a wedding with 'the black-eyed' awaits your son in Paradise."

The same view is also evident in news reports in the Palestinian press. Thus, for example, the reporter Nufuz Al-Bakri reported the death of Wail 'Awad as follows: "The mother of Wail 'Awad, from Deir El-Balah, did not plan on holding a second wedding for her eldest son, after his marriage on August 10, 2001 to his fiancée in a simple ceremony attended only by the family. But yesterday was Wail's real wedding day, and the angels of the Merciful married him, together with the [other] martyrs, to 'the black-eyed,' as all around [them] rose the cries of joy that his mother dreamed of on the day of his wedding [to his fiancée]."

Hamas official Ashraf Sawaftah told of a ceremony honoring Izz Al-Din Al-Masri, who carried out the suicide bombing of the Sbarro pizzeria in central Jerusalem on August 9, 2001: "His relatives distributed sweets and accepted their son as a bridegroom married to 'the black-eyed,' not as someone who had been killed and was being laid in the ground."

The uncle of Nassim Abu 'Aasi, who died while he was attempting to carry out an attack, said that when the deceased was asked why he was not married, he would always reply, "Why should I relinquish 'the black-eyed' to marry women of clay [i.e. flesh an blood]?"

"This is part of the Islamic belief," Hamas leader Isma'il Abu Shanab once explained to AFP. "Anyone who dies a martyr's death has a reward. If the martyr dreams of 'the black-eyed,' he'll get her."

The Hamas movement educates the children in its schools, beginning in kindergarten, to believe that a martyr is given virgins in Paradise. Jack Kelley of USA Today visited Hamas schools in Gaza City, where he saw an 11-year-old boy speak to his class: "I will make my body a bomb that will blast the flesh of Zionists, the sons of pigs and monkeys… I will tear their bodies into little pieces and will cause them more pain than they will ever know." His classmates shouted in response, "Allah Akhbar," and his teacher shouted, "May the virgins give you pleasure." A 16-year-old Hamas youth leader in a Gaza refugee camp told Kelley, "Most boys can't stop thinking about the virgins."

Along with the media, Palestinian Muslim clerics also help instill this belief. In an interview with the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, Palestinian Authority Mufti Sheikh 'Ikrima Sabri was asked what he felt when he prayed for the soul of a martyr. He answered: "I feel that the martyr is lucky, because angels bring him to his wedding in Paradise… I spoke with one young man, who told me: 'I want to marry the black-eyed women in Paradise.' The next day, he died a martyr's death. I am certain that his mother was filled with joy over his heavenly wedding. Such a son is worthy of such a mother.'"

So are lurid sexual fantasies all that spur suicide attacks? Of course not. But to deny this as an important recruiting tool - and to deny the issue of sexual repression as another of the (many) problems within fundamental Islam, is at least as dangerous as completely dismissing the economic and societal ills that have led to all those nights of rioting outside Paris and Arhus.

On a completely separate note, could the success of "Al Hoor al Ain" within the Arab Islamic world be giving us a better picture of how the "silent majority" views Islamism and violent Jihad? One can only hope.

Tags:

Islamism
72 virgins
Martyrdom

Muslims, Europe, the Global Umma...all that stuff.

Francis Fukuyama has published an insightful Op-Ed on WSJ.com, discussing Islamism, the reasons why it continues to find traction in Europe, and his ideas on a means of calming the radicalism.

I actually addressed the idea of a so-called 'Global Umma' some time ago here.

Since the end of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, several events have served to further bind the Islamic world community together, continuing the Islamic resurgence: continuing violence between Palestinians and Israelis; continued governmental repression as Arab leaders act to prevent a repeat of the Iranian revolution; the September 11, 2001 attacks on America; and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Equally importantly, members of the Umma increasingly take advantage of global communications technology to share ideas, views, goals, and concerns across any distance - thus turning regional issues into international concerns.

Regional differences, the practical reality of distance between states dominated by Muslims, and the majority belief among Muslims that war is not an acceptable answer preclude the idea of a single Islamic state. However, the resurgence of a Muslim identity that carries greater loyalty than the bonds to political bodies or nations, the global information revolution, and the weakening of authority this engenders in nation-states creates an environment in which the Umma serves as a powerful non-governmental organization capable of swaying the decisions of governments across the globe.

In a way, it ties into van Creveld's assumptions regarding the decline of the State. Modern communications tools allow the creation of very cohesive global communities that are more influential than many would have believed possible even ten years ago. These communities appeal to immigrants who have failed to integrate with the mainstream culture of their adopted home(s) - and create even greater appeal when those adhering to that mainstream culture begin circling the wagons - as we've seen to varying degree in Austria, the Netherlands, Britain, and France.

The success of the European social models (and most Asian social models, for that matter) formerly (or currently in the case of Asian powers such as Japan, Korea and China) rested on a firmly homogenous base. Thus far, Western European countries have stumbled in their efforts to build truly heterogenous cultures. As Francis Fukuyama notes in his piece, rigid labor laws that tend to prevent immigrants from entering the labor market play their own role in isolating European Muslims:

Contemporary Europeans downplay national identity in favor of an open, tolerant, "post-national" Europeanness. But the Dutch, Germans, French and others all retain a strong sense of their national identity, and, to differing degrees, it is one that is not accessible to people coming from Turkey, Morocco or Pakistan. Integration is further inhibited by the fact that rigid European labor laws have made low-skill jobs hard to find for recent immigrants or their children. A significant proportion of immigrants are on welfare, meaning that they do not have the dignity of contributing through their labor to the surrounding society. They and their children understand themselves as outsiders.

Francis is also on target when he discusses the fine line European leaders must walk in offering a way 'up' for immigrants in their societies without creating the sort of knee-jerk right wing populist response we've already seen. The current hard line being presented by French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy could be seen as an effort to secure this voting bloc as he prepares for the 2007 French presidential elections. Unfortunately, as we've seen in our own country as of late, the short term gains of politicians seeking office through populism often lead to long term losses for the country as a whole.

Tags:


Islamism
Europe
Terrorism