Indian Country, The Three Block War, and Iraq

Gregory Djerejian of The Belgravia Dispatch breaks down a Robert Kaplan article entitled "Indian Country" here. He includes a link to this article from The Belmont Club.

Both take a stab at discussing/dissecting U.S. deployment strength and tactical/operational effectiveness in Iraq.

I'll be the first to admit, my time in Afghanistan has biased my outlook on matters of troop strength. I think one of the reasons the U.S. has avoided the sort of problems encountered by the Russians (beyond the more obvious reason of our far more competent military) during their time in Afghanistan has been our lighter footprint. We haven't created a sense in the minds of many Afghans that we are an occupying power intent on bending the country to our will. Because Afghans believe they are still in charge of their own destiny, they take more responsibility for their own security, feel less threatened and angered by the U.S. presence, and look at U.S. troops as a force multiplier and fair neutral party as opposed to "occupiers."

Much of the tactical and operational planning for Afghanistan was done by leaders with a special operations background. The campaign was built around special operations forces. These forces and their leaders have a much greater understanding of how to interact with local leaders and forces. They are more comfortable working with other government agencies. The resulting campaign and occupation plan show much of that understanding.

That being said, Iraq is not Afghanistan. The ability of insurgents to move rapidly around the country, blend in with larger portions of the civilian population, and the ease with which they can be resupplied from outside the country make this a far different theater.

The conventional leaders that planned and executed the campaign in Iraq focused almost entirely on engaging and defeating conventional Iraqi forces. Little attention was paid to irregular forces. Little attention was paid to "securing the peace" after the initial occupation because so much time and effort had been spent wargaming how to defeat their conventional foes. It was at this point that the "warfighter" mentality among many conventional leaders and soldiers first reared its ugly head. At the point when civil authority needed to be restored, many of these leaders decided they were "shooters" and not cops. This decision changed the course of the occupation. It also fatally poisoned the relationship between the CPA and the military.

I think the initial idea behind the CPA was to create the sort of State/Defense blend referred to in the article. Unfortunately, different cultures, differing agendas, and wildly different conclusions on necessary steps led to more acrimony than harmony.

I spent 3 months in Iraq working for the CPA in and around Diyala and saw the best and worst of this cooperation. The relationship between top CPA officials and the brigade commander for most of the province was probably as good as it got incountry at the time. The two coordinated their efforts, met frequently, and tried to cover each others' back while offering a united front to Iraqi authorities they dealt with.

Of course, we could travel 20 km out of Baqubah and run into military patrols who had never heard of the CPA, didn't understand why were there, and didn't want to help in any way. A lot of this came down to the "war-fighter" mentality within infantry units. There are plenty of officers and senior NCOs who refuse to accept any sort of peacekeeping/peacemaking role. This sort of inflexibility is, I believe, what created much of the environment that has allowed the insurgency to spread and gain support.

I'm not saying the insurgency was caused by American actions (or inaction) and I'm not saying that it could have been prevented. What I AM saying is that it reached the level it has through a stubborn refusal by many military commanders (especially at the junior level discussed above) to accept there is more to the occupation than combat patrols.

All of that being said, I think we have arrived at a point in Iraq where a larger occupation force will hurt rather than help. Every effort needs to be made at more tightly integrating U.S. trainers and advisors into Iraqi combat units. Iraqis have to begin taking the same sort of responsibility for their own security that Afghans have. Until Iraqis show more belief that they are responsible for events in their own country, the U.S. occupation cannot succeed regardless of the size of the force. In fact, a larger force will likely only make matters worse.

Phillip Carter adds his thoughts on the plans for increasing American embeds in Iraqi units and the dispatch of former General Luck to survey efforts in Iraq here.

Together, these should be seen as good news stories. They reflect a growing willingness within the Pentagon to identify problems with the Iraq mission (for there are many), develop solutions, and implement those solutions. A number of individuals have suggested for some time that we expand the U.S. advisory mission to Iraqi forces. By doctrine, the mission of "foreign internal defense" is something that we use Special Forces and some civil affairs units for. But the mission in Iraq is far bigger than our SF/CA force structure, so we've used an ad hoc system of regular units to train Iraqi security forces. Apparently, that hasn't worked either. So now it's time to Americanize the Iraqi forces, as opposed to simply Iraqifying the war effort. (The latter can be roughly analogized to the Vietnamization effort that took place late in that war.) In any event, these two developments are positive. Assuming Gen. Luck can get the "ground truth" when he's in Iraq, and he's listened to, we may see more signs of improvement in the future. Hope spring eternal.

UPDATE:

Murdoc Online throws in his two cents regarding the importance of increasing the Iraqi army's proficiency...and the level of faith we should maintain in NATO's commitment to the Iraqi cause.

The Winds of Change.NET firmly stakes out its position in the middle ground between cheerleaders and doomsayers here.

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