The experts weigh in (Updated)

Although I've blogged on both the Newsweek "Salvador Option" (here) and Seymour Hersh's New Yorker article (here), neither of my efforts match those being produced by some notable experts in their fields.

From Douglas Farah on the Counterterrorism Blog, we get an analysis of what the death squads and U.S. policy were all about - as well as another condemnation of the Newsweek article's shoddiness. He also provides a link to David Holiday's site. This is essential reading for those looking to gain greater insight into Central America and U.S. involvement there during the '70s and '80s. David has exhaustively covered the current flap generated by both Newsweek and the New Yorker.

David includes a link to this great Foreign Affairs article from Jennifer Kibbe. She does a thorough analysis of the bureaucratic battle for control of covert operations, the legal ramifications, and the oversight currently provided by Congress. Although I question some of her assumptions, the facts she provides are outstanding - and provide a base from which to argue either for or against her (and others') opinion(s) regarding necessary oversight of covert operations. She also serves as a base for starting the discussion regarding whether or not America should attempt covert operations. Great reading.

Another posting of interest: Eric Martin at TIA breaks down the Iran options and their likely consequences.

Update:

David Holiday provides additional insight and some great links (here and here) ref: DoD's new intel-gathering unit and the debate that has surrounded DoD entry into an arena formerly dominated by the CIA.


From the 9/11 Commission Report, as quoted in the CRS report for Congress:

Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: “Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command.” The 9/11 Commission’s basis for this recommendation appears to be both performance and cost-based. The report states that the CIA did not sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11, and instead relied on improperly trained proxies
(foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory outcome.

The report also states that the United States does not have the money or people to build “two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations,” and suggests that we should “concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity.”

Military
Intelligence
Terrorism