The real Revolution in Military Affairs?

The American military has poured money, time, and resources into the idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) centered around "information dominance." In practical terms, this has meant equipping vehicles and soldiers with GPS, with "blue force trackers," and with the radio capability to run a "tactical intranet." In other words, to allow the information gathered at the lowest levels to be displayed all the way up to the highest levels. This tactical and operational RMA is designed to create better information for leaders making decisions on the battlefield. Has it done so? I don't know, honestly.

But that's not the real story here. Like the 'civilian' blogosphere with its ability to nimbly gather, process, and distribute information far more quickly than the establishment media services - albeit in a haphazard manner - a similar system has begun to develop almost accidentally within the military. As highlighted in this article from the New Yorker (hat tip to Phillip Carter at Intel Dump), information sharing outside the planned "tactical intranet" - and away from the battlefield - is expanding rapidly. The combination of easy Internet access in even the most austere forward operating bases and a growing savviness among junior leaders in sorting and manipulating this information make such tools as important to refining and adjusting TTPs as official doctrine.

Just as the informed consumer has changed the news cycle, these informed soldiers no longer feel the need to wait for official lessons learned and doctrinal changes from on high. And even as the Army tries to manage a similar program from the top down, the pace of information spreading between individual "nodes" on this decentralized network makes many of the official information channels either hopelessly outdated or serving as mere launching points for forward-leaning officers to build from - in much the same manner that bloggers feed off of MSM reporting. Dan Baum from the New Yorker elaborates:

The younger officers have another advantage over their superiors: they grew up with the Internet, and have created for themselves, in their spare time, a means of sharing with one another, online, information that the Army does not control. The “slackers” in the junior-officer corps are turning out to be just what the Army needs in the chaos of Iraq. Instead of looking up to the Army for instructions, they are teaching themselves how to fight the war. The Army, to its credit, stays out of their way.

The military has done its share of fielding "off the shelf" technology. Could this informal information sharing system serve as such an off the shelf project? Mr. Baum found proof of this as well:

Little by little, the Army is absorbing Companycommand.com and Platoonleader.org. In 2002, West Point put Platoonleader on its server, and a year later added Companycommand; both sites now have military addresses. The Army also began paying the Web site’s expenses. It sent all four of its founders to graduate school to earn Ph.D.s, so that they can become professors at West Point, where they will run the sites as part of their jobs. And the Army is starting to pay the Web sites the sincerest form of flattery: in April, the commanding general of the First Cavalry Division, Major General Peter Chiarelli, ordered up a conversation site for his officers. Cavnet, as it’s known, exists only on siprnet, and is vetted, as an official Army site.

Considering the pace of change within the insurgency - whether through changes in tactics, changes in the technology of IEDs, or otherwise, the military has no option but to increase its own ability to foster rapid change. As in the Information Revolution that has reinvented news media and corporate organization charts, the revolution is now reinventing much of how our military operates...and while "ruthless competition" in the civilian world means "adapt or go bankrupt," it often means "adapt or die" to those on the front lines. How much will this additional urgency increase the pace of change? Will the military continue to embrace it? What happens if it begins to break down the traditional lines of authority within the military? How nimbly will colonels and generals, unfamiliar with such fast-paced change and living outside the pressure cooker of direct combat, react? The blogosphere is a culture of criticism where few are considered above the fray. How will higher military leaders react to having ideas they disseminate pushed back with criticism and comments from subordinates? This is largely uncharted territory for a professional military.

Links to Platoonleader and Companycommand. Membership is required to access either site.


Update:

Winds of Change offers a similar analysis of the American military's adaptiveness.

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